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

RUSSIA'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE

Military Intelligence

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VANTAGE POINT

By Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr.

As Chief of the MI Corps, I try to get out to the field to see firsthand what our outstanding MI units and their soldiers and civilians are doing. For example, in the last 3 months I have visited three corps, eight divisions, and an Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) echelons above corps MI Brigade in their home garrisons, in the field on exercises, and during Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations.

In every instance I have been uniformly impressed not only with the extraordinary professionalism of our unit leaders and their personnel, but also with the outstanding initiatives and innovations underway in every organization. We can all benefit from this, and I want to share these great ideas with you by starting a dialogue in which all units contribute articles to **MIPB** describing the good things they are doing.

In this edition, we will start the flow of ideas with a series of articles on intelligence training from the 1st Infantry Division MI Team. During my visit to Fort Riley in May, I was totally impressed by the way Colonel Terry Ford, then the G2, and Lieutenant Colonel Bill Moore, the 101st MI Battalion commander, and their staffs were working together to produce some of the best intelligence training I had seen. Consequently, I asked them to write the training articles appearing in this issue and in the January-March issue.

Terry Ford has since moved on to become the Commander, 66th MI Brigade, and has been replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Brake as the G2 of the "Big Red One." Similarly, Bill Moore has completed a very successful command tour and has been selected to attend Senior Service College. Lieutenant Colonel Kirk Davidson has replaced him as the Commander, 101st MI Battalion.

The new leadership team is already building on the legacy left by their predecessors to provide the best possible intelligence training to their unit and staffs. Like their predecessors, they also enjoy tremendous support from the division commander, Major General Bill Hartzog, who has personally written an article for this issue. He also provided input and a key quote that we featured on the inside cover of our new **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**. Clearly, it makes all of our jobs easier when you get the command emphasis and support for intelligence that Major General Hartzog has provided in the 1st Infantry Division; and I see a lot of that, too, in my travels. So, if units want to include articles from their commanding generals when they submit articles on training or operational initiatives to **MIPB**, please do so.

You need to be aware of other developments impacting our corps. They include the following.

On July 3, we completed the Limited Users Test (LUT) of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-Short Range. The system performed well, providing outstanding intelligence and targeting in both mid- and low-intensity environments, day and night. It also successfully completed all live artillery adjustment missions. Equally important, the system operated at ranges in excess of 200 kilometers and routinely achieved over 8 hours endurance. If the testers and evaluators derive the same conclusions from the test that we did, the low-rate initial production of the system will be approved. We will have the first corps UAV-Short Range systems (16 UAVs, 4 ground control stations, and 8 remote video terminals per system) fielded in 1994 to a corps, as well as to the Intelligence Center for training soldiers and Marines.

From September 7 to October 11, we conducted the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) at Fort Hood. If test results prove successful, the ASAS-HAWKEYE Block I system will be fielded to 11 units starting in the second quarter of FY 93. We will follow the ASAS IOT&E with a LUT of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Ground Station Module (GSM) from November 2 to January 15. This test will determine if the Block I

(Continued on page 39)

By Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

As you know Army NCO leaders have begun to link appropriate levels of the NCO education system with promotion. Below are the educational prerequisites for promotion in the NCO ranks and when they are effective:

- ☐ The Primary Leadership Development Course for promotion to sergeant, October 1989.
- ☐ The Basic NCO Course for promotion to staff sergeant, October 1992.
- ☐ The Advanced NCO Course for promotion to sergeant first class, October 1993.
- ☐ Graduation from the Sergeants Major Course for promotion to sergeant major, October 1993.
- ☐ Graduation from the Sergeants Major Course is also required for appointment to command sergeant major.

It's very important that the right soldiers get the right level of training at the right time. If they don't, they will fall behind their peers.

The Department of the Army published a message dated 191400Z June 1992, "Linkage of the NCO education system to promotion (Active Component)." Every soldier should know these prerequisites, and NCO leaders must include this message into their NCO development program.

It's no secret that training is the top priority of every Army leader from the top to the bottom of the leadership chain. The downsizing of our Army will not affect our training strategy. We will continue to train to standards. Standards are the fundamental method used to gauge how well soldiers, teams, and units can perform a particular task. Training without standards is a waste of resources. Every task must have a standard and once that standard is set, soldiers must train to the standard. If you begin to compromise the standards of a task you have no standard at all. Remember, compromising standards will cost lives in combat—lives entrusted to the Army leadership by families who value freedom and understand its tremendous cost.

Training is the fundamental element that forges soldiers, teams, and leaders together into a powerful unit. It builds confidence in yourself, your equipment, your fellow soldiers, and your leaders. Quality training is not easy, but the payoff is that it saves lives. This simple tenet was highlighted by our success in the past three wars. **You must train as you intend to fight.**

There are no shortcuts to quality training. It must be conducted under the most realistic conditions possible. Training must be both physically and mentally challenging. Our soldiers expect their leaders to provide the best possible training. To do anything less would shortchange the soldiers and unit readiness. As we train, it is one thing to perform a task to standard under the best conditions; however, that same task must be performed to standard under the worst conditions, both day and night. When you have accomplished this, you have accomplished the task to standard.

Once standards are met, they must be sustained. The only way to do that is through sustainment training. It's as important to sustain standards as it is to meet them. Sustaining and building provide the cutting edge needed in battle. If you train up then fall off, and train up again and fall off, you will never have that edge. Sometimes that edge means the difference between victory and defeat, or life and death.

Keep your standards high!

FROM THE EDITOR

Our professional journals—designed to reach the broadest sweep of audiences across the widest range of issues—will be especially important in the years ahead. Each of us must assume a greater and more personal role in the reading of, and writing for, our journals and in the exchange of ideas and thoughts.

General Carl E. Vuono
U.S. Army Retired

Although this quote was published in **MIPB** recently, it bears repeating since it precisely expresses your role in the production of this professional journal. Frankly, if you're a passive consumer of this product, you're not playing your role to the fullest, since the quality of **MIPB** directly equates to the quality of your participation.

In Vantage Point, Major General Menoher calls for a dialogue among all the units. He writes that in his travels to the field he was impressed with "the extraordinary professionalism of our unit leaders and their personnel." Major General Menoher wants to make sure these great ideas and innovations in training and operations are shared. Since most of us don't get the opportunity to visit these units firsthand, **MIPB** is the ideal forum to discuss the good things they are doing.

With this issue, the dialogue begins. The 1st Infantry Division's G2 Section at Fort Riley is the first to respond to Major General Menoher's call for an exchange of ideas and innovations. This is a great beginning; let's keep the momentum going. Please contact us with your suggestions and submissions.

Major Timothy Gavin was immensely helpful in coordinating the 1st Infantry Division articles. I wish to thank him for his assistance.

As you may know, we no longer restrict ourselves to theme issues. In this way, we can select articles that are interesting, informative, and timely, regardless of the subject. This allows us to use quality articles as they come in and not to have to wait until that particular topic is featured. This issue is an excellent example of the good mix of articles that we can achieve when not restricted to one particular theme. Indeed, as soon as we became aware of Ms. FitzGerald's study of a draft of the new Russian military doctrine, referred to in a message in late July, we solicited an article from her. We are fortunate to have gotten that one as well as the other fine articles on Operation Provide Comfort and the tactical intelligence role in the Los Angeles riots.

Again, **MIPB's** unique contribution is that it provides the opportunity for readers to discuss all MI-related topics and to weigh the varying points of view. As such, it thrives on feedback from the readers. This is the best way we can be sure we're giving our readers what they want, need, and can use. Please give us the benefit of your comments about the articles in this issue, either content or presentation, or any other aspect of this journal. We work for you, and this is your Journal.

Finally, with this issue, an era in **MIPB** design comes to a close with the departure of our Art Director, Dutch Poggemeyer. After 13 years at the Intelligence Center and 5 years at **MIPB**, he leaves to pursue other avenues of expression for his considerable talent. Mr. Poggemeyer has our thanks for the high standards of creativity and quality that he set for this journal.

Annette Castro

LETTERS

Dear Editor:

I received my commission in May 1987 and was detailed Armor. After the Armor Officer Basic Course, I went to Bamberg, Germany, where I spent 39 months as a tank and scout platoon leader in the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment along the East-West German border. In December 1990, I deployed to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm with G Troop, 2/2 Armored Cavalry Regiment as a scout platoon leader. My platoon helped lead the way into Iraq for VII Corps. My platoon excelled and I was recognized for valor when I received the Silver Star Medal.

After returning from Iraq, I was notified by Department of the Army that I did not pass the Lieutenant Retention Board. Surprised and disappointed, I appealed the results and won a "relook." I made a PCS move to Fort Huachuca to attend the MI Officer Advanced Course and waited for the "relook" results. In June 1992, I was again notified by DA that I was not retained.

I have trouble understanding how the Army can recognize courage and excellence on the battlefield by awarding the Silver Star, yet decide the same soldier is not good enough to be retained on active duty. I have a solid military record. The only discriminator against me is one 3-month OER in which I received a three-block rating, just below center of mass. My senior rater was an armor lieutenant colonel who made his personal dislike for me very clear, to fellow officers and soldiers alike. I believe he was determined to end my career.

I realize there is a reduction in force and that I am not the only victim of the drawdown. However, I am angered that one 3-month OER by an openly biased rater could override my proven abilities in combat as a leader. Isn't combat what the Army trains for 365 days of the year?

I come from a long line of military officers and it is unfortunate that I will not carry on this proud tradition. My advice to MI leaders is to **not** take lightly your obligations as raters of subordinate officers, nor allow maneuver counterparts to "round out" senior rater profiles on MI officers. The MI Corps must take responsibility for keeping this watch if MI is to keep quality officers.

I will go on to a successful civilian career. I feel it is time the Army re-evaluate who is chosen for retention and why. I cannot help wondering: If a Silver Star for heroism does not qualify a combat leader for retention on active duty, what does?

1LT Paul D. Hains
Sierra Vista, AZ

Dear Editor:

My son, who was considering enlisting as a CI agent, found Major Regan Smith's article, "So You Want to Be a CI Agent?" (October-December 1991), interesting and informative. He did think, however, there was a lot left unsaid based on his observations from following me around in this business for the past 15 years. (His first contact with the crusty old CI warrant was at the tender age of 11.)

He was right. Although, the article dispels some common myths an 18-year-old might have about the CI business, it stops short of telling the whole story. It neglects significant changes in CI in the past several years—changes that will continue as challenges into the next century.

First, the end game in Army CI is catching spies. Espionage is regarded as the world's second oldest profession. The objective of espionage operatives and spies is to obtain information they aren't supposed to have. This is unchanged since biblical times. What has changed is what information they're after and how they get it.

Technological advances, the information glut of the past 30 years, the proliferation of computers, and the wide range of information that "somebody" wants to collect from us have combined to give even the best CI agent an almost insurmountable challenge—the key word being "almost."

The myths and facts Major Smith discusses are true. However, she stresses the aspects of being a tactical CI agent—muddy boots, going to the field, BDUs. I will not dispute that a CI agent is a soldier first and foremost. What is not said is that roughly two-thirds of Army CI agents are at Echelons Above Corps (EAC). This is not to say that EAC CI agents don't wear BDUs and muddy boots, but it does bring up two critical points.

First, the distinction between strategic or EAC CI agents and tactical or echelons corps and below CI agents creates artificial barriers that we cannot allow to continue. It is ridiculous to assume that CI agents in a corps or division, who have the same training and may, in fact, have been previously assigned to EAC CI units, suddenly lose their skills and qualifications once they're assigned to CEWI battalions.

Second, the Army's drawdown will impact heavily on EAC CI force structure. This means that the tactical CI force will assume part of the investigative and CI support work load that EAC units currently perform. We simply cannot afford not to involve the "tactical" CI force. Some tactical units, particularly those overseas, already do investigative missions. But, in reality, this "real world" mission falls to at least priority number two, behind training. Wake up, agents (and commanders), training to go to war is important, but don't lose sight of the fact that running a real, live counter-espionage investigation is the best METL training a CI agent can get. And besides, investigating a possible spy on your post is one of the best ways to protect your command.

Writing, reading, and the ability to deal with people are indisputable abilities every CI agent needs. What is omitted from that list is the ability to think. If you can only deal in absolutes —yes/no, black/white, is/isn't —then

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

RUSSIA'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE

By Mary C. FitzGerald

In May 1992, a draft of Russia's new military doctrine was published in **Military Thought**,[1] the foremost theoretical journal of the Russian Armed Forces. Despite much discussion about the ascendancy of civilian influence, the military has, indeed, reasserted its dominance over the development of this doctrine.

The essence of the new doctrine lies in current Russian views on the nature and requirements of future war. An examination of Russian military writings reveals both the visionary nature of these views and their unbroken continuity with Soviet military science. As in the Soviet period, the new political leadership has not sought to impede the development of those technologies perceived to be at the heart of future military capabilities: advanced conventional munitions (ACMs), directed-energy weapons, and space-based systems.

Russian Image of Future War

The new Russian military leaders continue to articulate a spectrum of threats that varies little from that of their Soviet predecessors:

- ☐ The United States is said to be modernizing its nuclear arsenal in order to implement a counterforce strategy.
- ☐ Russian military scientists argue that only two changes have occurred in NATO strategy: a shift in focus away from the central front and toward the northern and southern Theaters of Military Action imposed by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and a revitalization of the "flexible-response" strategy to counter the growing probability of low-intensity conflicts.
- ☐ The military continues to charge the West with superiority in conventional forces and an ongoing lead in emerging technologies.
- ☐ These experts warn of the territorial ambitions of Islamic states and the nuclear potential of about 24 additional states by the year 2000.

Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian military scientists view Operation Desert Storm as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics. For example, General-Major I.N. Vorob'yev recently summarized the central lessons of Desert Storm.[2] He begins with a statement unprecedented for both the Soviet and Russian press: The Iraqis lost the Gulf War because they fought with Soviet doctrine and Soviet weaponry. Indeed, the thrust of his article is a call for "new military thinking" on the part of "our generals and officers" who are still locked into the "inertial thinking" of the World War II generation.

According to Vorob'yev, Desert Storm represents one of those rare "turning points" in military affairs—akin to the Franco-Prussian War—that stands at the juncture of two eras in military art. Operation Desert Storm ended the era of multimillion-man armies and began the era of high-tech wars fought in the air, space, and "ether." While new systems were used only singly in past wars, a multitude of new systems was used on a mass scale in Desert Storm.

Vorob'yev argues that because it constitutes the first victory achieved without massive ground forces, Desert Storm prompted a radical reexamination of the structure of armed forces and the roles of particular branches. The emphasis shifted from quantity to quality because technological superiority nullified quantitative superiority in divisions and conventional arms. As a result, the technological indices of new weapons—which are capable, on the whole, of predetermin-

ing the outcome of military actions—now constitute the basis for analyzing the combat potential of the sides.

Vorob'yev argues further that Desert Storm demonstrated a shift in the balance of the spheres of military art. While tactics were dominant in all past wars, strategy and operational art are decisive now. As a result, the "battle" has ceased to be the sole means of achieving victory in war. Indeed, the revolutionary nature of Desert Storm lies specifically in its having generated such new forms of operational and tactical actions as the "long-distance" (remote) battle and the "electronic-fire operation." According to Vorob'yev, the electronic-fire operation consisted of surprise, massed, and prolonged missile, aerospace, and electronic strikes in conjunction with naval strikes. The electronic-fire operation predetermined the successful outcome of Desert Storm.

Vorob'yev notes that the novelty of this operation lies in the emergence of electronic warfare (EW) as a weapon equal to "fire strikes" in combat effectiveness. The essence of this new phenomenon lies in—

- ☐ The duration of the electronic-fire phase.
- ☐ The large quantity of new EW means employed.
- ☐ A simultaneous effect on Iraqi command and control (C^2) at all levels.
- ☐ The **synergism** created by precise coordination of EW and fire strikes.

According to Vorob'yev, Desert Storm also generated a shift from positional to maneuver warfare. While both types of actions were conducted equally in past wars, maneuver is now the dominant form. Desert Storm generated a new method of penetrating the defense: the electronic-fire strikes in conjunction with a double envelopment of troops—by land and air, and by the creation of an active front in the opponent's rear with air, air-mobile, and naval landing forces. This operation signals the eventual demise of linear actions, close-in combat, stable fronts, and long operational pauses. Vorob'yev notes, however, that some positional combat can still be conducted between technological equals.

Finally, Vorob'yev describes six changes in the principles of military art generated by Desert Storm:

- ☐ A shift from concentration to mobility of troops.
- ☐ A shift from massing troops to massing ACMs.
- ☐ A shift from unidimensional to multidimensional warfare, whose essence consists in decisive superiority not only on land but also in the air and "ether."
- ☐ A shift from selecting axes for the main strike to selecting "areas for concentrating efforts." Since the epicenter of the opponent's defense consists not in positions and lines but in a fire grouping—means of nuclear attack, air defense systems, antitank systems, EW systems, reconnaissance-strike complexes, and reconnaissance-fire complexes, all widely dispersed.
- ☐ The achievement of surprise by the mass employment of technologically advanced systems.
- ☐ Precise coordination of land, air, and space-based systems with regard to objective, place, and time during the air offensive.

"*Military Thought* further states that 'in announcing its military doctrine, Russia guarantees the unconditional implementation of all of its provisions.'"

Doctrine for the 1990's

Russian leadership is currently focusing not only on creating the Russian Armed Forces, but also on developing a new military doctrine for the 1990's and beyond. This doctrine is based on "defense documents adopted by the Russian president and Supreme Soviet, as well as by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Council of Heads of State." **Military Thought** further states that "in announcing its military doctrine, Russia guarantees the unconditional implementation of all of its provisions."

The new doctrine describes two "direct" military threats to Russia: the introduction of foreign troops in contiguous states; and the buildup of forces near Russian borders. In addition, a violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons "ethnically and culturally" identified with Russia in the former Soviet republics is viewed as "a serious source of conflicts." It is extremely interesting that Russia now views **conventional** strikes on its nuclear and other "dangerous" targets as an escalation to weapons of mass destruction—which implies that such strikes will elicit a nuclear response.

According to Russian doctrine, local wars are becoming the most probable type of warfare. But large-scale conventional wars may arise with the

escalation of local wars either aimed against Russia or the CIS or unleashed in regions adjacent to their borders; and after a "prolonged threat period" that involves general mobilization. The doctrine assigns priority to wars fought with existing and emerging conventional weapons.

The new doctrine describes three distinct components of the Russian Armed Forces:

- ☐ A limited number of forces in permanent readiness in the theaters to repel local aggression.
- ☐ Mobile reserves or rapid-response forces capable of quickly maneuvering (deploying) to any region to repel mid-level aggression together with the permanent readiness forces.
- ☐ Strategic reserves formed during the threat period and during war to conduct large-scale combat actions.

The new doctrine also describes the two priorities of Russian military-technical policy: "emerging high-precision, mobile, highly survivable, long-range, standoff weapons"; and arms, equipment, and command, control, and communications (C^3I) systems whose **quality** will permit a reduced **quantity** of arms.

The doctrine stresses that Russia must have a military-technical policy and weapons programs on par with world standards. In order to achieve this objective, the doctrine calls for reducing procurement of arms and equipment in serial production; and maintaining research and development (R&D) and production capacities to ensure the development **and rapid surge production** of emerging combat technologies.

A comparison of Russia's new doctrine with the 1990 Soviet military doctrine reveals at least five key changes:[3]

1. In 1990 the main "wartime objective" was to "repel aggression." In 1992, the main "wartime objective" is to "repel aggression and defeat the opponent."

2. In 1990 the main "development goal" was to "repel aggression." In 1992, the main "development goal" is to "optimize the TO&E" for all possible wars and combat missions.

3. The 1990 doctrine held that nuclear war "will" be catastrophic for all mankind, while the 1992 doctrine holds that it "might" be catastrophic for all mankind. In addition, the 1990 doctrine stated that nuclear war "will assume a global character," and that calculations on limiting it to a single region are untenable. In 1992, however, both of these provisions have been deleted—which implies that limited nuclear warfighting is now a possibility. These changes may stem from Russian perceptions of the growing proliferation of nuclear weapons on their borders, which increases the possibility of a limited nuclear conflict.

4. The 1990 doctrine held that conventional "sufficiency" meant that no large-scale offensive operations could be conducted. In 1992, however, conventional "sufficiency" means that no large-scale offensive operations can be conducted "without additional deployments." Gorbachev's 1987 prohibition against developing large-scale offensive capabilities has clearly been rejected.

5. The 1990 doctrine stressed that Soviet military art was based on a "defensive strategy," and that the USSR excluded the delivery of a preemptive strike. Defense was said to be the main type of military action at the outset of war. In 1992, however, these provisions are deleted. Instead, the Russian Armed Forces will conduct "all forms of military action," will conduct defense and offense equally, and will seize the strategic initiative to destroy the opponent.

One explanation for these striking divergences from 1990 Soviet doctrine lies in the dramatic changes that have since occurred in the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the new doctrine clearly rejects the longtime civilian call for forces structured solely to conduct **defensive** operations.

The Russian military's reassertion of its influence is also discernible in two broader aspects of the new doctrine. First, while Gorbachev's concept of "reasonable sufficiency" was stated to guide Soviet force development in 1990, the military's concept of "defense sufficiency" is stated to guide Russian force development in 1992. Second, Russia's 1992 doctrine defines "military-strategic parity" as approximate **quantitative** equality in all types of weapons—a clear rejection of the civilian call for a **qualitative** assessment of parity.

The new Russian doctrine also reflects the pervasive impact of Operation Desert Storm on Russian military thought. Since the early 1980's, such prominent military thinkers as Marshal Ogarkov have argued that emerging technologies are generating a new "revolution" in military affairs. Russian military scientists now argue that Desert Storm confirmed these predictions.

First, Russia's new doctrine assigns priority to the new systems used in Desert Storm: ACMs, EW, and C^3I. Russian military scientists argued, for example, that ACMs accomplished nuclear missions during the war. EW is said to be a weapon equal to "fire strikes" in its combat effectiveness. Advanced C^3I systems are said

to be just as important as the entire "correlation of forces and means." In fact, superiority in EW and C^3I is said to ensure victory in future war.

Second, the doctrine lists a new strategic mission for the Russian Armed Forces: to repel a surprise "aviation-missile attack" (the electronic-fire operation). Russian leaders believe the objectives of the new electronic-fire operation will be achieved without the seizure and occupation of enemy territory. Instead, the new objectives consist of "suppressing the opponent's political or military-economic potential" and "ensuring the victor's supremacy in political or economic arenas."

Third, the new doctrine stresses the decisive importance of the war's initial period, which is said to consist of air and naval strikes aimed at disrupting strategic deployments, disorganizing civilian and military C^2, and removing CIS states from the war. The destruction of economic and military targets by ACMs will be accompanied by simultaneous or preemptive EW. In **subsequent** periods, the opponent **may** deploy ground troops under strong air cover.

It is noteworthy that a strong civil-military consensus exists regarding several key aspects of the new Russian Armed Forces. All parties agree that—

- ☐ These forces must be smaller, more professional, more mobile, and equipped with emerging technologies.
- ☐ "There is no alternative" to the development of ACMs, which are viewed as the "basic deterrence factor" of future war, and cheaper than both nuclear weapons and large armored forces.
- ☐ R&D must be maintained at the expense of procurement as the defense budget declines.

This consensus is reflected in a list of seven new priorities for the Russian Armed Forces that were recently announced by both Vice-President Rutskoi and Defense Minister Grachev. The new priorities include highly mobile troops, army aviation, long-range ACMs, C^3I systems, military space systems, air defense systems, and strategic arms.

"A review of his speech suggests that the 1992 published doctrine resulted from a compromise between 'harder' and 'softer' views on the requirements for Russia's military security."

The Rodionov Response

From May 27 to May 30, 1992, a "scientific conference" on "Russia's Military Security" was held at the General Staff Academy of the Russian Armed Forces. Colonel-General I. Rodionov, head of the General Staff Academy, delivered the keynote speech, entitled "Some Approaches to Developing Russia's Military Doctrine." Among others, Defense Minister Grachev described the speech as a "bold" one. Another commentator noted that much of what Rodionov said would not have been heard before from the lips of a military man—"even in a situation of strict secrecy." A review of his speech suggests that the 1992 published doctrine resulted from a compromise between "harder" and "softer" views on the requirements for Russia's military security.

In short, Rodionov argues that Russia's new military doctrine must unambiguously specify Russia's vital national interests, current threats to these interests, and the probable nature of future wars and military actions. In achieving this objective, he warns, the doctrine must ensure "that we not deceive first of all ourselves, and that we not [subscribe to doctrinal provisions that] either justify hasty political declarations or seek to increase trust in us by the world community." Russia's new military doctrine, he stresses, must serve the Russian people "not in words but in deeds."

Rodionov first describes the **"global, regional, and national interests"** of Russia—none of which are enumerated in the 1992 published doctrine. He begins by stating that any attempts at the political, economic, scientific, and cultural isolation of Russia (be they in Europe, Asia, or some other part of the world)—as well as the creation of any military-political alliance directed against Russia—will **"violate Russian national interests."**

According to Rodionov, the very expansiveness of Russia predetermines that its "vital interests" on the Eurasian continent extend from the Atlantic seas to the Pacific Ocean. For example, these "vital interests" include the East European states (former members of the Warsaw Pact) that border on the CIS. At the very least, these states must maintain their neutrality because their entry into military-political groupings aimed directly or indirectly against Russia would seriously damage the latter's strategic situation.

Rodionov notes further that Russia's "vital interests" include the Baltic states and require that these states—

- ☐ Recognize Russia's right to free access to seaports.
- ☐ Unconditionally reject both the stationing of

third-country military forces on their territory and entry into military blocs aimed against Russia.

- ☐ Guarantee the civil rights of the Russian population in these states.

He also contends that for many centuries, Russia has struggled to acquire exits to the Baltic and Black Seas. Therefore, "the deprivation of such free exits would conflict with [Russia's] national interests."

As for the CIS countries, Rodionov continues, all of the Commonwealth states are in the sphere of Russia's vital national interests. Russia must prevent these states from becoming some kind of "buffer zone" or "cordon sanitaire" separating Russia from the countries of the West, South, and East. Therefore, attempts by any state in Europe, America, or Asia to capitalize on existing disagreements among the CIS states or to strengthen its influence in these states could negatively affect its own situation. Such attempts would violate Russia's national interests and security.

Finally, Russia's national interests include maintaining mutually advantageous economic relations with all countries of the Near, Middle, and Far East; and using the waters of the world's oceans for free navigation and economic activity.

Rodionov then describes current **threats** to Russia's vital national interests—none of which are specified in the 1992 published doctrine. First, Russia's interests in the aforementioned regions are said to conflict with the interests of other states, and, above all, the "vital interests" of the United States in these regions.

Second, the United States and NATO are said to be not only maintaining but also rapidly increasing their vast military might. The incorporation of new, more effective types of weapons is quickly compensating for some quantitative reductions in their armed forces. Rodionov claims that currently the NATO countries have about 20,000 means of air attack, as well as a developed system for basing them near Russian borders. He contends that, as a result, these countries possess massive offensive power that is rapidly being further developed. In addition, one of the strategic principles of the United States is said to be the maintenance of superiority in the "aerospace" and on the seas.

According to Rodionov, many postwar military conflicts—including the Gulf War—demonstrate that the United States and NATO could use military force to achieve their military-political objectives. He concludes by stressing that a military threat to Russia's national interests "currently exists and is unlikely to disappear in the near term." Therefore, "it is impossible to agree with the view that **no one now threatens us**" simply because ideological differences are disappearing: "This is completely false."

Along with enumerating Russia's vital national interests and the current threats to these interests, Rodionov also suggests adjustments to the 1992 published doctrine in the following three areas:

- ☐ The probable nature of future wars.
- ☐ Possible military actions at the outset of war.
- ☐ The role of nuclear weapons in future war.

The probable nature of future wars. Two scenarios the published doctrine describes have already been discussed here—the escalation of local wars and a "prolonged threat period" that involves general mobilization. Rodionov adds a third scenario: "when military assistance is provided to one or several countries that have been subjected to aggression." (Why this would not remain a local war is unclear.) In addition, Rodionov states that local wars which violate Russia's national interests may arise not only near the borders of Russia and the other CIS countries, but also "**in remote areas**."

In addition, Rodionov stresses the possibility of conflicts—national, religious, civil—that undermine stability within Russia and require the intervention of armed forces. Russia's new doctrine must, therefore, focus much more attention on the principles of conducting "conflicts designed to restore stability within the country." He contends that "opposition forces struggling for power" reject the notion of using the Russian Armed Forces to accomplish domestic missions, but once in power they begin to look differently at the role of these forces.

Possible military actions at the outset of war. The published doctrine states that Russia will conduct all types of military action, will conduct the offense and defense equally, and will seize the strategic initiative to destroy the opponent. Indeed, it describes the final demise of Gorbachev's 1987 "defensive doctrine." While Rodionov welcomes these provisions of the published doctrine, he apparently believes they require greater elaboration.

Our military doctrine, he begins, recently envisaged the conduct of only defensive actions at the outset of war. After that, a counteroffensive would dislodge the opponent from captured territory. Military actions would cease upon reaching the state border and would not be conducted on the aggressor's territory: The opponent would be fought "not

on foreign but on our own territory." In essence, the opponent was to be ejected beyond the state border and the mission of destroying him was not assigned.

"History demonstrates that defense, passivity, and loss of the strategic initiative have never yet led to victory. And Gorbachev's defensive doctrine prematurely surrendered the initiative to the opponent."

According to Rodionov, it is impossible to agree with such doctrinal tenets regarding the conduct of military actions. They clearly reflected certain political moods and ignored the laws of armed combat. These tenets are essentially "fatal" for the state and predetermine its defeat in war. History demonstrates that defense, passivity, and loss of the strategic initiative have never yet led to victory. And Gorbachev's defensive doctrine prematurely surrendered the initiative to the opponent.

Therefore, Rodionov stresses that Russia's new military doctrine must succinctly, clearly, and unambiguously reflect the premise that if the opponent initiates aggression, then the laws of armed combat will immediately take effect: state borders will cease to exist. The armed forces should then select and implement those forms and methods of military action that are the most effective in the given situation: offense, defense, and delivering fire strikes on the opponent no matter where he is. **Above all, these methods must include the delivery of strikes on the aggressor's territory,** on his most important military and economic targets.

One explanation for this dramatic change stems from Russian perceptions that a future war will be waged with standoff, conventionally armed, "aerospace" weapons. Rodionov concludes that it is, therefore, necessary to reject such notions as defensive doctrine, defensive strategy, defensive armed forces, and so forth.

The role of nuclear weapons in future war. The published Russian doctrine implies the growing possibility of a limited nuclear conflict, and a nuclear response to **conventional** strikes on Russia's nuclear and other "dangerous" targets. Rodionov, on the other hand, offers a much more provocative view regarding the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's military doctrine.

According to Rodionov, the United States can reach Russian territory **on all sides and throughout its depth** not only with nuclear weapons but also with general-purpose forces. Russia, on the other hand, can reach neither the United States nor many other potential opponents with its general-purpose forces—and all the more so in light of the conversion process currently taking place. Therefore, Russia is left with only its strategic nuclear forces, and above all the Strategic Missile Troops.

However, he continues, Russia's new military doctrine again tries to articulate the nuclear no-first-use pledge. In Rodionov's opinion, statements on "no first use of nuclear weapons, retaliatory strikes, and defensive nature" only repeat those past mistakes that stemmed from the "self-advertising of political leaders" and inflicted "irreparable damage" on the nation's defense. For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons are the basic political weapon for deterring aggression and preventing war.

It will, therefore, be an "irreparable mistake," he charges, if Russia does not openly declare that in the event of aggression, it will use its entire arsenal—including nuclear weapons—to destroy the opponent and to defend its interests. In fact, Rodionov goes so far as to propose that statements on the use of nuclear weapons be excluded altogether from Russia's new military doctrine. Here, it should be noted that one explanation for Russia's rejection of the nuclear no-first-use pledge may proceed from loss of confidence in its own conventional options.

"Russian military doctrine thus remains highly dynamic and visionary even in the current 'time of troubles.'"

Conclusions

The following conclusions can be made about the military-technical aspects of Russia's new military doctrine. The new doctrine—

- ☐ Assigns priority to wars fought with existing and emerging conventional weapons.
- ☐ Views the Gulf War as the paradigm of future conventional wars.
- ☐ Calls for the maintenance of R&D at the expense of procurement as the defense budget

(Continued on page 29)

Tactical Intelligence Training

By Major General William White Hartzog

One of the most successful military organizations in history, the Roman Army, was described as having trained so hard in peace that combat was merely bloody training. In contemporary times, the U.S. Army has also achieved such realistic training in the Combat Maneuver Training Centers that our success in DESERT STORM can be directly attributed to this intense, bloodless combat training. The lessons of recent conflicts in Grenada, Panama, and Southwest Asia clearly show there are no guarantees that the world will be any less violent or demanding of our military skills.

In two issues of **MIPB**, the MI soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division (the "Big Red One") capture the best training ideas from the division's MI community and offer them to the readership. Our purpose is to stimulate continued discussion and to promote ways of continuing to improve the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS).

These articles cut across the spectrum of intelligence training within a division. This issue's articles discuss the general intelligence training philosophy within the division and introduce one of the 1st Infantry Division's primary training tools, the Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) System. The authors demonstrate how soldiers must master

Training the MI Force

By Colonel Terrance M. Ford

In peacetime, there is no more important mission than training. This absolute applies to soldiers of all components, ranks, and branches. During Operation Desert Storm, the Army had the opportunity to validate training principles and standards in a combat environment. The results speak for themselves: The U.S. Army is a trained and combat-ready force.

No one should underestimate the contributions MI soldiers make in helping train our Army. Knowledge of the enemy, derived from the unit's mission essential task list, is the base on which an intelligence training program should be anchored. In combat, the enemy drives tactical operations. In peace, how to destroy that enemy should drive unit training.

This article offers guidelines on training the trainer. That is, how to train the MI force so that it can enhance the training of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. While the following comments apply at the regimental, division, or corps level, anyone involved in training the MI force can apply them. As such, the article is not a recipe for success; but rather, it identifies 10 factors that trainers of MI soldiers need to understand and appreciate. It also provides the framework within which we can assess the training.

"In peacetime, there is no more important mission than training."

MI soldiers are difficult to train.

This fact has nothing to do with aptitude, attitude, or basic intelligence. To the contrary, most MI soldiers are bright and enthusiastic. However, MI soldiers are scattered throughout the force structure, and they hold a wide variety of diverse intelligence military occupational specialties (MOSs). Many signals intelligence and imagery intelligence MOSs are high tech, while most human intelligence soldiers depend on perishable language skills. The number of MOSs multiplied by the spectrum of skill levels is a training challenge. Especially, when you realize that the only thing a ground surveillance radar operator and an interrogator have in common is the MI brass they wear.

Collective training for MI soldiers is often beyond the unit commander's capability.

Certainly, we can develop training scenarios to challenge some sections and platoons. However, without a real-world environment, it's hard to train

and Systems

intricate skills to accomplish the Intelligence BOS tasks.

In the January-March issue, the MI soldiers use the theme of preparing for a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) to show that success in tactical intelligence operations is clearly a team effort. Additional articles, such as support to JTF-6, demonstrate existing non-NTC training options.

In my experience, I find that the greatest success is achieved when the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are fully understood in terms of both specifics and time. When the Intelligence BOS is focused on the CCIR as its primary function, two things happen. Each MI leader and supervisor quickly come to understand how their intelligence function interrelates with the rest of the MI System of Systems. Likewise, the division staff and subordinate commanders and their staffs achieve a focus as well as a realistic expectation.

In summary, the articles in these two issues should either reaffirm good ideas already known, provide new insights, or trigger a professional difference of opinion that can be discussed in an ongoing dialogue.

Major General William White Hartzog is the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Fort Riley, Kansas.

order of battle analysts to track a battle or to make rapid analytical judgments about enemy capabilities and probable courses of action. A real-world tactical operations center in the field would be flooded with a volume of often conflicting reports. While we can simulate this environment by field training exercise play, it's difficult to replicate a realistic information flow in a classroom. All MI soldiers face these training challenges unless they're lucky enough to execute real-world missions in their MOSs.

Many players are involved in training MI soldiers.

Appropriately, unit commanders are responsible for training their soldiers. However, like soldiers holding other low-density MOSs, MI soldiers may be forced into a consolidated training program. When assigned to operational units, MI soldiers have to balance real-world missions with training requirements. Balancing priorities between a commander and staff supervisor is also a problem for soldiers in a headquarters element. Senior MI unit commanders have similar concerns in dealing with a G2, G3, commanding general, or assistant division commander/deputy commanding general. All of them are involved in, or have a legitimate interest in, training the MI force.

TRADOC trains critical tasks.

While we know and accept that the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command schoolhouse can train soldiers only on the critical tasks, other tasks must be trained at unit level. This is especially critical for soldiers serving in low-density MOSs. Higher echelon consolidated training, monitoring, and self-study are all critical to these soldiers. Young officers often have the dual challenge of developing intelligence skills while learning a wide variety of garrison duties that traditionally fall to the S2. Unless the unit has an aggressive training program, even soldiers in MI units may have trouble developing the full spectrum of skills if those tasks aren't part of the operational mission.

"The only thing a ground surveillance radar operator and an interrogator have in common is the MI brass they wear."

Products are training.

Obviously the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and its products meet this definition, as do reports generated by operational units with a real-world mission. However, other units engaged in training can further a soldier's professional development by turning out products that enhance wartime skills or increase technical know-how. While many of these reports may not be read outside the intelligence community, it's still

useful to produce them if it helps to train soldiers. We must balance training (production) against other requirements; however, we shouldn't reject this important training tool just because it has only limited value to the supported organization.

Intelligence training must be tailored.

MI soldiers serve in a variety of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Obviously, the needs of those commanders differ; so should the training of their intelligence personnel. Similarly, training should be focused on the type of organization the unit is in, such as heavy, light, Special Operations, tactical, TOE/TDA, strategic, joint, or combined. Finally, the geographic theater in which the unit operates, or anticipates being assigned in war, is a critical factor in a tailored training program.

MI soldiers must do it all.

The days are gone when MI soldiers could sit behind the green door of a stovepipe organization and opt out of such non-operational training as maintenance, physical fitness, soldier skills, marksmanship, and drill and ceremony. Today, MI soldiers work in all units at all echelons. Even soldiers assigned to strategic MI units should not be exempt; their next assignment may place a premium on such skills. Operational units have to balance their real-work mission with training requirements, but we must address and resolve these issues if MI soldiers are to mature professionally with their peers.

Training programs must be properly resourced.

In training, as in anything else, you get what you pay for. Training needs to be fully resourced—that means time, money, equipment, and talent. Not only must we make training resources available, but we must program them well in advance so they'll be allocated and fully used. Commanders and supervisors of MI soldiers must be fully involved in training. They must identify training needs, allocate and prioritize resources, establish standards, conduct training, and provide meaningful feedback. But most important is their personal involvement in this effort. If the boss doesn't participate, attend, or periodically observe training activities, it's hard to convince junior leaders and soldiers that what they're doing is critically important.

"In training, as in anything else, you get what you pay for."

MI soldiers must understand the enemy.

Although this seems obvious, the potential threat has changed. Global political changes have resulted in the decline of the Soviet/Russian threat and an increase in possible regional conflicts. Since the West has studied the USSR and its doctrine for 45 years, our intelligence officers could predict, with relative accuracy, movement rates, weapons employment, tactics, and objectives.

Today, we know less about potential threats. They use a variety of weapon systems, and often an ill-defined, changeable doctrine based on indigenous conditions, foreign training and advisors, and senior leader preferences. As such, we must rely on sound tactical principles, weapon system capabilities, and local conditions. At the tactical level, this means less dependence on reference manuals and more reliance on cognitive thinking. Our MI soldiers can do this, they just need to be trained to do it.

Intelligence is for commanders.

This frequently quoted, but often misunderstood, statement means that MI personnel need to be in tune with their supported commander's intelligence needs. We must get the most out of high-tech systems. We must describe system capabilities in everyday language not "technobabble." MI soldiers must understand the supported unit's missions, operational capabilities, and informational needs. If they don't, they won't be able to anticipate the commander's intelligence requirements in time to energize collection systems, analyze data, and prepare and distribute products. These functions require a thorough understanding of the friendly commander's concept of the operations and scheme of maneuver. Without such knowledge, intelligence takes on a life of its own and becomes an end in itself. Then, of course, it cannot satisfy the axiom that intelligence is for commanders.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army is a trained and ready force, and MI soldiers have an essential role in sustaining our recently demonstrated combat edge. Collectively, as a Corps, we can meet our training responsibilities to the larger Army, but only if our soldiers are trained and ready. MI soldiers are more than capable of handling the rigors of a demanding training program, but their commanders and supervisors must appreciate and adhere to basic training principles and realities. These leaders, including non-MI personnel, must understand that the responsibility for a trained and ready force is one they share with Fort Huachuca.

Fortunately, recent political events coupled with the Army's downsizing provide an opportunity to assess whether we're meeting our responsibilities to MI soldiers, and whether they are meeting their responsibilities to the commanders and units they support.

Colonel Terrance Ford is the commander of the 66th MI Brigade, Augsburg, Germany. Past assignments include G2, 1st ID. Colonel Ford graduated from the U.S. Army War College, the British Army Staff College, and the Command and General Staff College. He has a bachelor's degree from The Citadel, a bachelor's degree from the University of Maryland, and a master's degree from the University of South Carolina.

Resourcing Intelligence Training in the "Big Red One"

By Major Timothy P. Gavin

The U.S. Army has long recognized that training is critical in preparing units for combat operations. Currently, due largely to successes in combat as well as at the NTC, the need for intelligence training is receiving increasing emphasis. Intelligence training traditionally focuses on two areas: improving technical skills in the MI battalion and improving common soldier skills in maneuver units.

Training in maneuver units is usually the responsibility of brigade and battalion S2s. Some excellent battalion-level intelligence training programs do exist. However, these programs are largely individual efforts that often die when the S2 leaves. A division must have an established effective concept for intelligence training if it is to win on the dispersed battlefield of the future. An effective intelligence training concept must include—

- ☐ Committed resources.
- ☐ Training exercises.
- ☐ Technical assistance.
- ☐ Evaluations.

Committed Resources

To be effective, divisions must resource their intelligence training with experienced soldiers. The 1st Infantry Division places a strong emphasis on training by investing significant personnel resources in manning the G2 training section. The G2 is the senior intelligence trainer. However, the daily management of intelligence training rests with the Assistant G2, Training. The Assistant G2, Training is a major or a senior captain, and is assisted by one or two other officers.

The training section's enlisted members include a 96R (Ground Surveillance Radar Operator)



"If, in peacetime, our focus is to prepare for war, the investment of experienced soldiers is not a waste."

NCOIC who is a master sergeant or sergeant first class; a 96B (Intelligence Analyst) senior intelligence sergeant first class or staff sergeant; a 96B sergeant; a 96D (Imagery Analyst) sergeant; and one or two junior enlisted analysts. The division's modification table of organization and equipment does not specifically identify a training section's personnel requirements.

The training section is built around its wartime mission and provides intelligence support to the division tactical command post (DTAC). The DTAC mission drives the selection of soldiers for the training section. The nature of DTAC operations and communications channels makes it the ideal vehicle for a training section in garrison. Relationships between soldiers in the DTAC and those in brigade and battalion S2 sections are reinforced in both garrison and field environments.

The initial reaction to this manning level is astonishment. Why waste experienced officers and NCOs in G2 training sections? Some believe that intelligence training, by implication, lacks importance. In contrast, combat arms trainers are the most experienced NCOs and officers. In the division G3, the trainer is a senior major, often assisted by several other majors. The maneuver battlefield operating system (BOS) does not have sole rights to experience. To have an effective intelligence training program, a division must be willing to commit the resources. If, in peacetime, our focus is to prepare for war, the investment of experienced soldiers is not a waste.

An additional benefit in selecting senior soldiers as intelligence trainers is the role of tutor. One of the most important assets in the Intelligence BOS is the battalion S2 section, which often receives little MI mentoring. Once assigned to a unit, S2s get bogged down in trivial matters, and are frequently left on their own.

However, combat arms officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers have a chain of experienced commanders and staff available to mentor them as they progress in their field. While coaching exists in the MI battalion, its focus is in the unit. Majors or senior captains who have been battalion and brigade S2s, and whose primary mission is to train subordinate intelligence staffs, can focus their efforts on helping the unit S2.

Training Exercises

Along with providing experienced soldiers as trainers, intelligence training must be logically

G2

The G2 Workstation is an Intelligence Center initiative which provides an IEW collective training opportunity for G2/IEW commanders and their staffs. Units come to Fort Huachuca and use the simulation to train to their training goals.

The workstation provides a controlled IEW focused environment for a variety of contingency situations. It is an interactive Janus (Livermore version) simulation running on a VAX 4000. The simulation is output to six Tektronic workstations where player-controllers manage the battle. A program written at the Intelligence Center takes battle information from the Janus simulation and formats text reports. These reports are based on the collection systems of the division operating the scenario and are then sent to various terminals in the training facility for the G2 and the MI battalion to use.

Korean and European scenarios are currently available, with Southwest Asian and Latin American scenarios planned. Although the software is developed mainly for SIGINT systems, the G2 Workstation provides output for IEW collection systems ranging from long range surveillance detachments to JSTARS. The training unit can manage the pace of the battle, and units can restart to gain maximum training.

Future plans for the workstation include strengthening the HUMINT portion to include CI operations and investigations and interrogation operations. Additionally, the Intelligence Center, along with III Corps, has successfully exported the output of the simulation through TROJAN/TROJAN SPIRIT so units can use the simulation from their home stations.

planned. The plan must focus on training both intelligence and nonintelligence soldiers, ideally using a variety of methods. The G2 training section's emphasis is on helping brigade and battalion S2s throughout the division. The section supports training exercises, technical assistance, and evaluations.

Several types of exercises prepare units for combat operations. As operating budgets shrink, units frequently turn to computer simulations to train their staffs. The 1st Infantry Division uses the BBS System to train battle staffs. The system can run a simulation on European or NTC terrain. For enemy forces, Soviet or Krasnovian (NTC) order of battle and Soviet doctrine provide a common baseline. Brigade and battalion staffs work through the staff estimate process by planning and executing a variety of missions. The G2 training section plans and executes opposing force (OPFOR) courses of action during these simulations.

There are three advantages when the G2 controls the OPFOR:

- ☐ The friendly unit is engaged with an independently controlled OPFOR that uses Soviet doctrine.
- ☐ S2s no longer function as enemy commanders. This allows them to direct their sections through the IPB process without already knowing the complete enemy situation.
- ☐ The process of developing the OPFOR scheme of maneuver is used as a formal method for training the division's intelligence analysts in the development of enemy situation templates. (This procedure is discussed in detail in Captain Starrett's and Sergeant Sholl's article, "Creative Intelligence Training.")

In another approach to training S2s, the 1st Infantry Division developed a BBS-driven simulation called the NTC S2 Workshop. Similar to the Intelligence Center's G2 Workstation, the workshop trains and evaluates S2 sections in a low-pressure environment. It begins by bringing an S2 section into the G2 training section classroom. The section receives an NTC mission and is given a reduced amount of time to conduct a mission analysis. G2 training officers fill roles of unit S3 and/or commander, providing guidance to the S2 section as required.

The S2 section prepares and briefs their products as they complete each portion of the IPB process. When the entire planning process is done, the section moves to the simulation center. Once in the simulation center, analysts track the battle using combat information the BBS System produces. The G2 training section passes the message traffic by telephone. The S2 tries to confirm or deny the situation template, and makes recommendations to the commander, who changes the friendly plan to reflect the new information.

BBS The Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) is a two-sided, free-play simulation system designed to provide brigade and battalion commanders a means to train their battle staffs. This system emulates current doctrine at the tactical level in a real-time environment. The decision-making process is exercised by responding to real-time combat situations in maneuver, fire support, air defense, engineer, NBC, tatical air, air transport, Army aviation, logistics, maintenance, medical, personnel administration, higher headquarters functions, and threat operations.

BBS is composed of 10 identical workstations, each one based on a DEC MicroVax 3100 microcomputer operating in a VAX DECNET local area network. The moulded architecture includes a higher control station, 4 maneuver workstations, artillery control, air operations and air defense workstation, personnel and logistics workstation, and 2 threat workstations. Each station controls the different units and subunits that are allocated during system initialization and in accordance with the exercising unit's task organization.

BBS is a training tool designed to refine warfighting skills with practical experience. The system can simulate terrain, weather operational states, maneuver orders, mine fields and obstacles, engagement, direct and indirect fires, TAC air, Army aviation, air defense, personnel and logistics, and engineer tasks.

A detailed initialization procedure provides the information the BBS uses in the evolving simulation. Unit capabilities and restrictions, as well as the battlefiled environment, are combined to provide as realistic a simulation system as possible.

Technical Assistance

The G2 training section's second function is to technically assist unit S2s. We provide several training programs and training products to assist units.

Training Programs. The first program is the Tactical Intelligence Training Program. This recurring

program uses subject matter experts to instruct division analysts in various technical skills. Subjects include terrain and weather analysis; reconnaissance and surveillance planning; and developing situation, event, and decision support templates. Each subject is taught individually and includes practical exercises. This program, which completes a full cycle every 6 months, allows for personnel changes within units. The division benefits from this program in two ways:

- ☐ Both officer and enlisted analysts receive training in tactical skills needed in their jobs.
- ☐ We make the maximum use of experienced analysts by asking them to spread their wisdom throughout the division—both outside and inside a formal training structure.

A second program is the Directed Study Program. In this program, battalion S2s use G2 training section facilities, resources, and expertise to focus on identified training deficiencies. S2s develop mission-oriented training objectives based on their METL, command guidance, available resources, and priorities. Using the S2's training objectives and the results of pretests, the G2 training officer helps the S2 develop the instruction. The G2 training section provides the training site, materials, and required assistance.

Each individual in the section researches specific subjects to produce fact sheets, which they brief to each other. G2 training section soldiers proof the fact sheets and distribute them throughout the division. In this program, the S2s are provided separate office space so they can identify those METL tasks they feel need more practice.

G2 training section personnel also coordinate training support from other agencies. As the proponent for the Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program, the training officer focuses the REDTRAIN plan on areas requiring resources the division usually doesn't have. We also maximize resources like the NTC's REDTHRUST Mobile Training Team (MTT) and the REDTHRUST leader's course. The G2 training section coordinates the visit of Fort Irwin's MTTs as part of a unit's NTC preparation packet. This year the team conducted two MTTs, one before each of our brigade's rotations. We also coordinate slots for the REDTHRUST leader's course.

Training Products. In 1988, we began to produce unclassified intelligence documents entitled Tactical Reference Guides. These guides stem from the need for a well-organized, single-source document that increases an S2's speed and efficiency during tactical operations. The guides consolidate tactical information of interest to S2s, such as doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment. The first guide, which focuses on Soviet doctrine, was updated in late 1991. A second guide, using the same format, focuses on the NTC. Various units field test and validate the reference guides during tactical operations.

Creative Intelligence Training

By Captain Pam Starrett and Sergeant Robert Sholl

> *To be successful in combat, the Army must train continually to develop and maintain combat-ready soldiers, leaders, and units that can perform assigned tasks to specific standards.*
>
> ***FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training***

Close your eyes and imagine you're in the G2 van of a division tactical operations center. It should be easy to conjure up pictures of the activity around you. Officers are poring over maps, while briefing commanders and writing intelligence reports. Enlisted intelligence analysts are serving as radiotelephone operators, maneuver control system operators, and journal clerks. Although these functions are important, they don't allow our enlisted intelligence analysts to practice their perishable 96B MOS skills. One way to help junior analysts become proficient in the IPB process is to have them develop OPFOR courses of action for combat simulations.

The G2 at the 1st Infantry Division allows maneuver units on post to use the BBS System to train their staffs on the staff estimate process and subsequent execution of an order. The G2 assumed responsibility for conducting OPFOR missions because he wanted to make sure a doctrinal OPFOR for blue units was portrayed. The G2 gave

Other products include a Soldier's Guide to the NTC, and a color NTC OPFOR Equipment Poster. The Soldier's Guide gives individual soldiers current information on subjects ranging from the OPFOR, to weather, to safety in the Mojave Desert. The poster consolidates visual modification photos with charts outlining characteristics and capabilities of each system in a single medium. The visual modification poster epitomizes our assistance philosophy: When 2d Brigade S2 personnel requested help to prepare for the NTC, our G2 training section worked with them, and jointly developed the poster which provides information to the individual soldier.

Evaluations

The last training function, evaluation, provides the greatest benefit. No training program can survive without feedback to the trainee. Evaluations are a critical part of our participation in any portion of the plan from training exercises, to combat simulations, to the Directed Study Program. Formal evaluations, conducted by experienced officers and NCOs, provide the most constructive feedback. When a battalion receives an external evaluation, the minimum requirement we put on the evaluator is that he or she has successfully held the same position, and that the training criteria be based on ARTEPs and MTPs. Here, in the 1st Infantry Division, the senior evaluator is usually the Assistant G2, Training. Other training section members often assist in the evaluation.

Intelligence training is vital to the success of any tactical military unit. Regardless of the echelon, MI soldiers must receive training in the Intelligence BOS. If the MI Corps is to deliver what is expected of it on the dispersed battlefield of the future, we must overcome the stigma that both the Army and the MI Branch place on intelligence training.

Senior intelligence professionals must get their boots dirty, and pass experience directly to our young S2s in the field. When properly resourced and directed, intelligence training enhances a unit's ability to fight and win. We don't claim to have all the answers. But, by outlining some of the successful programs the 1st Division uses, we can help other units develop their own effective programs. The ideas discussed here come from experienced MI professionals. Effective intelligence training must be resourced with people, equipment, and time, as the 1st Division has done.

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the BBS OPFOR mission to the G2 training section, and it is a top priority. We use the BBS System to train junior intelligence analysts in many of their MOS skills.

This training requires division intelligence analysts to go through a three-phase process to support blue force simulations: planning, briefing, and executing OPFOR courses of action.

Many of these analysts participated in combat simulations before and are accustomed to doing intelligence tasks from the blue perspective. However, these simulations are much more involved because analysts now have to "think red" as well as "think blue" to build a doctrinally correct scenario that exercises the blue force.

At the G2 training section, the BBS team consists of an officer and an NCO who play the OPFOR commander and the deputy commander. For each simulation, the G2 training section chief requests four junior intelligence analysts from various units in the division, and attaches them to the BBS team. Every analyst in the team has an important role in each phase of the process.

The roles are different for every simulation. For a blue battalion simulation, the OPFOR employs a regiment: the officer is the division commander, the NCO is the regimental commander, and the enlisted intelligence analysts are battalion commanders. For a blue brigade simulation, the OPFOR employs a division: the officer is an army commander, the NCO is the division commander, and the enlisted intelligence analysts are regimental commanders.

The officer's primary role is face-to-face coordination with the Exercise Simulation Division (ESD) and the blue force being exercised by the simulation. The officer is also the senior OPFOR controller before and during the simulations. As

division commander, the officer back-briefs the blue force commander and staff at the unit's after action review. This brief includes an overview of how the OPFOR intended to conduct the battle, and how the battle actually transpired. The NCO's primary role is situation development and OPFOR data base manager. The NCO also oversees the conduct of the battle. Intelligence analysts plan, brief, and execute OPFOR courses of action.

Planning

The first phase of the three-phase process is planning. Lasting 2 or 3 days, planning is done the week before the simulation. On the first day, the division commander issues an overlay showing the regimental area of operations. (For the purpose of this article we're using the simulation for an attacking blue battalion, and a defending OPFOR regiment.) The division commander is familiar with blue force objectives and has viewed their operations overlay. The division commander then builds an OPFOR divisional area of operations and issues the overlay to the regimental commander. The division commander gives the regimental commander the mission to "Defend," with certain mission guidelines, such as percentage of strength, objectives, and unit designators.

Commanders begin the planning process with an overview of the mission and terrain. (We use the NTC or Germany.) They also review the "Soviet" symbology to construct their plans. We still use Soviet doctrine for combat simulations for several reasons. First, we know more about their doctrine and can build a realistic scenario based on that doctrine's documentation. Second, the armies of the Commonwealth of Independent States and other former Soviet satellites will most likely continue to use this doctrine. Finally, the OPFOR at the NTC uses it, and several of our simulations are NTC train-up exercises. (For more information on individual training, see Captain James Stockmoe's article, "96B Intelligence Training: Unit Techniques.") Before developing their courses of action, the analysts do a complete terrain analysis of the area of operations and assess blue avenues of approach.

When constructing the regimental defense, commanders emplace all available assets (organic and attached) on the battlefield. They have free rein within doctrinal constraints to task-organize regimental assets. The commanders must—

- ☐ Develop maneuver axes for all elements that flex to support the defense.
- ☐ Build a regimental counterattack force, a regimental artillery group, and a divisional artillery group.
- ☐ Employ a security zone, and develop routes and missions for regimental reconnaissance teams.

The regimental commander oversees the development of the OPFOR courses of action. The regimental commander directs, coaches, and teaches while asking questions that prompt the battalion commanders to discover gaps in their plans. Together, they discuss air support (fixed wing and rotary), service support, artillery fires, counterattack missions, and decision points based on potential blue force events. They work on these templates for 2 days and then move on to briefing.

Briefing

The second phase of training is briefing the course of action. Once the OPFOR course-of-action templates are complete, battalion commanders (96B enlisted analysts) brief their plans to the division commander, who makes sure the plans are doctrinal and comprehensive. The battalion commanders then make any necessary changes, and brief the chief of the G2 training section who selects the course of action the BBS team will pursue for the first mission.

Execution

The third and final phase of the simulation is execution. The BBS team does this at the simulation center. First, the analysts go through a computer train-up and mini-exercise to familiarize themselves with the terminals and how to maneuver forces. The NCO conducts the train-up, and ESD personnel oversee the mini-exercise which includes terminal operators from opposing and friendly forces. There are six positions in the OPFOR cell: Two maneuver computer stations, two artillery and combat service support computer stations, the OIC (division commander), and the NCOIC (regimental commander). For the execution phase, only two junior analysts are maneuver commanders; the other two are artillery station operators.

The NCOIC divides the motorized rifle, tank, air defense, antitank, reconnaissance, and air forces between the two maneuver stations. For example, Maneuver Station 1 may have the regimental reconnaissance, the security zone, and all counterattack forces. While Maneuver Station 2 has the main defensive belt. The divisional artillery group is on one artillery station, and the regimental artillery group is on the other. Combat engineers are also on the artillery stations.

Second, analysts input information by using their templates to place their assigned forces on the

computer map. This entails more than simply selecting a grid coordinate and telling the computer to place "X" unit there. In this step, analysts must—

- ☐ Check line of sight, fields of fire, observation, cover, concealment, and withdrawal routes for each defensive position.
- ☐ Have the engineers fortify the position.
- ☐ Build maneuver legs for reconnaissance teams, units that flex, and counterattack forces.

When all forces are in place, the analysts input preplanned artillery fires and final protective fires for their defensive positions. The entire process takes 3 to 4 hours. Now the OPFOR is ready to fight and win.

Role Playing

During the simulation, OPFOR maneuver commanders are responsible for maneuvering their assigned forces, requesting fire missions from the regimental artillery group, and keeping the OPFOR commander informed of blue units with whom they come into contact. As the overall maneuver commander, the NCOIC stands to the rear of the computer terminals, monitors the activity, and controls the division artillery group fires. As the top OPFOR commander, the OIC makes sure subordinate commanders adhere strictly to doctrine. The OIC also serves as liaison officer between the OPFOR cell and the blue "brigade cell," and periodically provides intelligence reports (based on the blue force S2's collection plan and available assets) to support the blue force templating effort.

These efforts combine to provide a strong training environment for the entire BBS team. To get valuable training in their MOSs, analysts are able to—

- ☐ Practice procedures for at least 11 of their skill tasks, including—
  - Estimate effects of terrain on threat and friendly courses of action.
  - Determine avenues of approach using modified combined obstacles overlays.
  - Determine mobility corridors within identified avenues of approach.
  - Develop combined obstacles overlays.
  - Identify and annotate target areas of interest.
  - Develop situation templates for each avenue of approach.
  - Prioritize avenues of approach.
  - Determine air avenues of approach.
  - Present intelligence briefings.
  - Prioritize threat probable courses of action.
- ☐ Become proficient at creating situational templates by planning OPFOR courses of action.
- ☐ Become more comfortable as briefers.
- ☐ Participate in wargaming by running their course of action (situation template) through a mock battle.

Although using combat simulations to train our enlisted intelligence analysts is not the only way to ensure their proficiency, it does allow them to practice their skills in a low-stress, low-pressure environment. This has already proven to be an invaluable training opportunity.

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Sergeant Sholl is a 98C (Signals Intelligence Analyst) assigned to the G2 training section as NCOIC of simulations. He was formerly an Air Defense Artillery operations intelligence assistant in Germany.

96B Intelligence Training: Unit Techniques

By Captain James Stockmoe

Tactical intelligence training is definitely a challenge. The Advanced Intelligence Training Course uses a broad-brush approach to train 96B Intelligence Analysts for their follow-on assignments. However, only when they arrive at their units, are they trained to perform those intelligence analysis duties directly related to their unit's METL.

While every unit is unique, this article presents simple training techniques to train intelligence analysts, officers, commanders, and staffs for division, brigade, and battalion duties. Training must focus on three areas: Enemy, weather, and terrain.

Enemy

The Advanced Intelligence Training Course teaches intelligence analysts the fundamentals of their MOSs: doctrinal templating, enemy order of battle, and basic terrain analysis. Clearly, these first steps in the IPB process are essential, but it is the unit that develops and trains the analytical skills.

One inexpensive way to train your analysts is to purchase stickpins, cardboard, spray paint (red and blue to start), and some white, fine-tip lacquer paint pens from the post self-service store or your local office supply store. Using red stickpins, mark each cardboard square to depict individual threat vehicles, platoons, and other symbols commonly used in your unit's threat template.

Next, draw enlarged grid squares (conex inserts work well) on the cardboard at about 1:12,500 scale (8 cm x 8 cm each). Then, set aside a block of time to train. Give your NCOs a mission, such as, "Depict a doctrinal motorized rifle battalion in the offense with companies on-line and platoons in column." Give them time limits and tell them when you'll be back to be briefed. Leave the room, and let the NCOs train. You'll be amazed at the result.

The amount of coaching required depends on the level of training your analysts have. Once they've mastered this exercise, move on to more difficult scenarios. Using the stickpin method, throw in some twists. Challenge them to learn the doctrinal distances and progressive movement formations. Make them shift their perspective from offense to defense. The combinations are endless. Use blue stickpins to indicate friendly vehicles and small units. Then take the next step.

Terrain

Terrain analysis is the second step in the process. To depict actual or figurative terrain, draw contour lines and terrain features on the cardboard. Once you've drawn in the terrain features, give the analysts scenarios that require them to apply the enemy stickpins to the terrain (situation template).

Encourage your analysts to develop alternative enemy courses of action. Work from the simple to the complex to create a realistic training progression. This helps you assess your analysts' strengths and weaknesses. Throw in some variables, such as friendly smoke, engineer obstacles, and artillery. Cotton balls, chartpack, and colored construction paper are excellent for this purpose.

For more advanced and deliberate analysis, have your analysts construct a 3-D contour relief model with the cardboard. Use whatever contour interval you wish. For the NTC, U.S. Geological Survey maps provide a superb scale at 1:24,000. Color the contour lines you want to use and then cut along the lines to create the layers. A hobby knife and some glue are all you need. Finish by drawing grid lines onto the cardboard relief model.

Map relief models are excellent aids in training your unit on it's contingency area. They have the added benefit of making the analyst complete a detailed terrain analysis on the area of operations. One analyst in my unit used this technique to depict the westernmost Iraqi brigade for detailed rehearsals before starting combat operations during Desert Storm.

At this time, set up scenarios with the stickpins and cardboard. Again, allow the NCOs to train the soldiers. Give your NCOs scenarios and let them go at it. Or, let them choose some aspect they want to emphasize. Have the analysts look at the board from different angles. Give them a partial solution to a problem and have them fill in the missing pieces. Walk them through the calculus of transitioning from movement formations, time/distance factoring, presentation rate, and maneuver corridor analysis. The options are endless. With these techniques, you can train your analysts to construct situation

templates in a low cost, progressive manner. You can also use these training aids to transition to other training, and, most important, wartime battle tracking and analysis.

You can also use the same stickpin drill to train your officers and other support personnel. Recently, the brigade officers were provided a short update on IPB, and then we set up a practical exercise. Given tasks, conditions, and standards, the officers split up into working groups by battalion with other support personnel. They laid out a reinforced motorized rifle regiment in an offensive scenario using the cardboard NTC terrain boards and stickpins. All the officers in the group were responsible for placing their enemy battlefield operating system counterpart stickpins.

As a result, all the players were able to understand the threat movement formations as the enemy transitioned to final attack formation. This visual hands-on training has been applied to myriad scenarios and terrain. Battalion S2s are also using it to train their battalions. It encourages wargaming and tactical discussions between battalion commanders, S2s, and S3s. These simple, inexpensive tools also enhance discussion about battle calculus for engagement areas, engineer obstacle development, and artillery targeting.

Weather

Weather analysis is the third step in the process. Analysts and intelligence professionals get little weather analysis training and its profound effects on military operations, particularly trafficability and observation. However, it is critical to mission success that intelligence analysts get training on predictive weather analysis.

Photo courtesy of the author.

Staff Sergeant David Rhodes briefs other members of the 101st MI Battalion with a 3D terrain model (1:24,000 scale).

For weather training, you need specialized tools. The unit must have a FALOP: a forward area limited observation plan (belt weather kit) with a barometer. The barometer is used to predict weather, which is essential data for the M1 tank ballistic computer. Barometric pressure changes are a major indicator of future weather. Elevation changes also affect barometric pressure. The barometric pressure where the unit weather element is reporting from may differ significantly from the unit's actual location on the ground.

Have your analysts develop a weather effects chart and matrix to use in the tactical operations center to graphically show forecasted weather information. Show its effects on specific weapon systems. One technique you can use is the red/amber/green method by time groupings. Your unit may have certain systems it wants to emphasize based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available factors.

Transition to War

While units must adapt to battle tracking techniques their commanders are comfortable with, the stickpin method has several advantages, one of which is the level of detail. The stickpin method reflects reality, which is that situation development and analysis are built from individual spot (SALUTE) reports. Further, commanders can more easily understand at a glance a joint S2 and S3 battle tracking map board.

As your analysts receive spot reports, they can plot the individual vehicle stickpins on the joint S2/S3 map board and write a date-time group next to the pin in nonpermanent ink. As the resolution improves, individual vehicle pins may be replaced by platoons. The process builds on each new piece of information. Often, brigade and battalion analysts focus on enemy platoons.

With stickpins, you can get better resolution than with rectangular stickers. Too often analysts, and commanders, become fixated on the symbol rather than the actual terrain the unit is occupying. In reality, a unit is more like an amoeba than a nice neat box. That's why it's useful to depict the unit by the disposition of vehicles in an area the unit occupies.

Often, it's hard for a unit to track battle damage. One solution is to replace red stickpins with black ones as analysts get reports of destroyed enemy vehicles and units. This method is better than the battle damage assessment chart because it allows

(Continued on page 29)



CHANGING GEARS:
Special Operations Intelligence Support to OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

By Captain Christopher P. Costa

It wasn't until the final days of Operation Provide Comfort that I fully understood the intelligence cycle and, especially, the collection effort. During Operation Provide Comfort, both of these battlefield processes had to be altered to adapt to a humanitarian effort. Unknowingly, we had modified intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to fit the existing situation. This article focuses on intelligence lessons learned, and how they can be applied to future humanitarian support operations.

On January 13, 1991, the 2d Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (A) deployed to Turkey to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The intelligence groundwork for standard mission support was laid; and our mission, which had been evolving since September 1990, was conducted within the generic framework of Special Operations.

On March 15, 1991, we redeployed back to Fort Devens. However, our real surprise came on April 5 when we were alerted for deployment back to Turkey to provide immediate humanitarian support to Kurdish refugees. Displaced persons (DPs) were flooding Turkey's border areas and dying by the thousands.

The move back to Turkey was a classic contingency deployment with very little planning time. However, this operation would be very different from Desert Storm. The 2d Battalion's mission was to insert Special Forces operational detachments into the formidable terrain of Southeastern Turkey and Northern Iraq. Their mission was to assess the situation "on the ground" and to report the status of the DP camps to the battalion

operations center. These assessments would be used to aid the delivery of emergency resupplies to the DP camps. This was a role reversal for these battalion-level soldiers, since the results of this mission would be humanitarian aid.

Normally, Special Operations support and detailed preparation of target areas are critical to Special Forces operations. But in Provide Comfort, we had to forego detailed preparation because the situation required immediate response. The trade-off was a calculated risk—but the payoff was that thousands of people were being immediately resupplied, given medical treatment, and being allowed to organize in their own defense.

Collection Management

Initially, there was much to be sorted out and defined. It was important that this purely humanitarian operation would not be misinterpreted by the media. As in battlefield operations, information collection was the initial focus of this operation, even though the consumers of this information were the movers of food, water, and medical supplies. To help these people, we needed to know how many refugees were in the camps, how many required immediate life-saving medical support, and what their water sources were. As the operation progressed, the answers to these questions became perishable very quickly. Evaluation and analysis were quickly overcome by our rapid response to the plight of the DPs and the need to provide immediate support to save lives.

A primary example of "perishable information" was the requisite identification of tribal leadership in the camps. In other Special Operations missions, leadership identification has varying applications for short- and long-term data base purposes. However, in the camps, we identified the leaders so our teams could quickly organize humanitarian support.

Even in this environment, we had our priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Collection managers graphically depicted the PIR on a collection board to show to what extent they had been answered—either partially, fully, or not at all. The S2 section managed the collection effort while battalion MI Detachment analysts reviewed all traffic from any PIR. Logistic requests and associated traffic, as well as operational situation reports, answered PIR. Consequently, analysts could identify intelligence gaps on a graphic collection matrix board. Analysts cross-referenced actual transmission records of daily situation reports on the board so they could review the raw data as a complete document. Interestingly, the answered PIR provides a historical chronology of significant events in the camps.

Team debriefing was a critical tool in answering intelligence gaps and clarifying conflicting information. It is conducted immediately after a team mission. Debriefing begins with the preparation of a mission and flows through the extraction, and all the intelligence gathered is meticulously detailed. During Provide Comfort, intelligence personnel were able to enhance their reports by actually going to border areas to observe and experience the mood of the camps. At times, PIR were answered by debriefs on site. In short, the collection plan we developed was modified to process, to track, and in some cases, to analyze answers to PIR. The chart on the following page shows the IPB modified for humanitarian intelligence support operations.

Refugee/Area Evaluation

As a matter of doctrine, every military operation requires a battlefield area evaluation. The "piece of the pie," in relation to areas of operations and interest, is assigned to subordinate units, and analyzed in relation to the assigned mission. Because humanitarian support missions are earmarked as contingency operations, there can be little preparation, and, as in Provide Comfort, areas of operations emerge as the contingency operation unfolds.

In Turkey, three areas of operations were subsequently assigned, based on the DP population relocating to the Turkish border. The 2d Battalion's three camp areas were *Uzumlu, Cukurca*, and *Pirinceken*, Turkey. Initial DP population estimates were 40,000, 128,000, and 13,000 respectively. A Special Forces B team (also known as a Humanitarian Service Support Detachment [HSSD]) was assigned a camp and its surrounding area.

When the operation started, two areas were identified as initial priorities for intelligence personnel. The first priority was force protection from a terrorist threat. (I will elaborate on this later in a discussion of the threat and CI evaluation.) The second priority was to ensure teams were aware of the customs and courtesies of the Kurdish people.

An important lesson we learned from the camps is that understanding the culture of the people proved invaluable. The Kurdish have a reputation as gregarious people who are not extremely ascetic in their Moslem beliefs. However, making sure teams had a baseline cultural knowledge of these people proved a multiplier that enhanced the operation's success.

The significant lesson here cannot be overstated. That is, areas in need of humanitarian support should be evaluated in terms of width, depth,

PHOTO: RICHARD BYRD



height, and time, just like a battlefield area would be. More important, it is critical that the teams or supporting units have some knowledge of the people they are helping. For example, Kurds usually treat their elders better than they treat their children. In effect, this is their own "cultural triage." Armed with an understanding of Kurdish culture, and by conducting pre-area evaluation, teams were better able to cope with cultural differences.

Terrain Analysis

Terrain analysis is a critical aspect of pre-employment preparation. The focus of terrain analysis for humanitarian support is to identify terrain which could hamper relief efforts.

Analysts also had to identify water sources. During any humanitarian operation, it is assumed that potable water will be a major concern. To combat this problem during Provide Comfort, teams had water source overlays before they went into the area. Additionally, a topographical team provided elevation overlays which helped HSSDs analyze a terrain's trafficability. Significant terrain variations and map corrections were also identified and answered as applicable PIR.

Land mines were a constant concern to the teams. Soon after arriving at a camp, two 2d Battalion soldiers were injured by land mines. A hard lesson learned from this incident is that we failed to capitalize on the locals' knowledge of the area. Because we failed to do this, mines adversely affected our initial humanitarian support. Although mine fields may be an exception, the unique problems associated with them should be a sober reminder that detailed terrain analysis is, indeed, necessary. Other terrain factors that hampered humanitarian support quickly became a priority also. Terrain analysis is just as important in humanitarian operations as it is in battlefield operations.

Mobility corridors and avenues of approach took on new meaning during Operation Provide Comfort. Initially, we weren't concerned with templating doctrinal movements of motorized enemy forces.

However, when the DP situation stabilized and we began moving DPs back to their Iraqi homes, HSSDs analyzed the terrain in detail and conducted reconnaissance and analysis of possible routes back into Northern Iraq.

Bridges and other choke points became key terrain and critical nodes. All terrain in the area of operations was determined to be either trafficable or not trafficable. Helicopter reconnaissance reinforced team assessments. Teams calculated movement rates by talking to leaders and families who had previously traveled these roads.

The teams even got imagery from some of the HSSDs that were able to overfly their mission areas during initial emergency resupply drops. However, there's no substitute for terrain reconnaissance. But because of the urgent nature of the operation, these early reconnaissance missions were the only ones conducted before the teams went in. Needless to say, it is critical to use all opportunities to reconnoiter the area of operations before going in.

The basic principles of terrain analysis are the same for humanitarian operations as they are for battlefield operations. However, priorities and perspectives change depending on the ground situation. Mine fields, water sources, and trafficability presented their own unique problems. Applying the unique terrain priorities established for Provide Comfort will guide intelligence preparation in future humanitarian operations.

Weather Analysis

Unique to humanitarian operations is the fact that weather, in itself, may be the cause of a humanitarian deployment. For example, the United States supported humanitarian efforts in Bangladesh because of a devastating cyclone. And, our deployment to Turkey was accelerated because of the harsh seasonal climate in southeastern Turkey, which was causing deaths due to exposure. The impact on the world audience of hundreds of children and elderly people dying each day due to the cold was profound. Weather proved to be the catalyst for the speedy assistance given the Kurds.

Weather also played a critical role in logistic resupply since at the beginning, jackets, tents, and blankets were critical in saving lives. Universally, the effects of temperature, humidity, and precipitation are significant to military operations. However, in Provide Comfort these effects impacted the survival of tens of thousands of people. The effects of bad weather could have been catastrophic, and unlike battlefield preparation, in this scenario bad weather favored no one.

To help with weather analysis, an Air Force weather detachment was attached to the forward operating base at *Yuksekova*, Turkey. Weather forecasting became the priority—specifically, severe weather, as alluded to earlier. One big problem we encountered was "data denied areas"—Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon. Historical, observational, and forecast data were denied for political, military, and practical reasons. An important lesson learned from this was that we needed a forward deployed observation team to be the forecaster's forward eyes.

Weather teams are normally allowed access to forward areas of a humanitarian support mission. The assumption is that the areas are secure and receptive to their presence. These two-person weather teams provided hourly observations throughout the areas of operations, thus relieving the HSSDs of this responsibility. In this way, real-time weather data transmitted back to forecasters became another multiplier in accomplishing the mission.

Threat and CI Evaluations

Tens of thousands of people living in a small area is a potential powder keg. However, two factors ensured relative security: First, the resupply and support we gave the DPs resulted in a natural scheme of internal security. No member of any camp, regardless of motive, could successfully undermine U.S. efforts. Thus, CI in the camps was a natural result of people "protecting their protectors." Second, the HSSDs were able to communicate with and assimilate into the DP groups. Any problems, either real or perceived, were expressed to the teams, and team members were able to diffuse the situation before it got out of hand. The bottom line was the HSSD's ability to be "in touch" and cognizant of mood swings in the camps.

Our antiterrorist data base included the history, capabilities, and idealogies of terrorist groups in Turkey. Studies of the data base indicated the threat to U.S. forces in the camps was relatively low. However, the command preached terrorism awareness extensively. And our troops avoided becoming chance targets by being mistaken as host nation forces, or simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Every group of this size has its quota of mentally unbalanced people whose actions could not be predicted or factored in. Experience at the Joint Interrogation Facility during Operation Just Cause showed that turmoil occasionally reigned and that screening could not filter out the mentally unstable. In Turkey, we did not screen people for access to

the camps. One evening an elderly woman claimed that Iraqi intelligence operatives had poisoned the communal well at *Cukurca*. For about an hour she created total hysteria. Dozens of people vomited, fainted, and "showed symptoms" of poisoning. Although medics tested the water and found it to be safe, people still "got sick" from it. Problems such as these were not uncommon. The countermeasure for these unpredictable situations was to use common sense and to stay alert.

A community of this size also has its alleged drug smugglers and murderers. There were those who simply stole for their families' survival. However, justice was swift in the camps, dispensed internally by the various tribal leaders. Shootings were frequent, and the end result was no less tragic in some cases. Again, the team's best defense was to be circumspect and to stay alert and cautious.

Another volatile group was the crusaders. The *Peshmerga* (Iraqi freedom fighters), *PKK* (Kurdish Workers Party), self-proclaimed mercenaries, disgruntled Iraqi Army deserters, alleged Iraqi secret agents, and various other Kurdish separatist groups and factions all felt they had a right to voice their grievances—sometimes all at once, incessantly articulating their wants and needs. The HSSDs reiterated to these groups, like a broken record, their mission statement: to provide humanitarian support, not to wage guerrilla warfare nor to subvert the Iraqi government.

Reports from the camps and intelligence warnings flowed back and forth through the operations center to the MI Detachment all-source center. Eventually, these reports filtered down to the teams. Occasionally, organic CI agents and agent assistants were dispatched to the camps to access CI activities. We maintained liaison with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations since their people were responsible for all CI operations in Turkey.

Additionally, the Turks aggressively assumed responsibility for the security of U.S. forces, particularly at the forward operations base. Turkish forces were also collocated with the HSSDs at base camps. This subsequently reinforced the overall force protection posture. Augmenting host nation security, the teams conducted low-profile walking patrols 24 hours a day at the forward operations base. The S2 section essentially established staff supervision over Air Force Security Police, who maintained their organic chain of command.

Iraqi military forces were not a threat to our teams at the camps. Nevertheless, new concerns about the Iraqi military emerged. For example, example, toward the end of our mission, we had to move thousands of Iraqis south, back to their homes. To determine the condition of the roads and to reassure the people, the Air Force flew various tribal leaders over these planned routes. This gave the leaders an opportunity to see that Iraqi forces were not in the area, and indeed south of the locations stipulated in security resolution agreements. As a result, the tribal leaders' confidence in U.S. forces evolved into an all-important aspect of threat evaluation. From an intelligence perspective, the concern was no longer regiments, but rather any Iraqi equipment that could impede DP movement. In this scenario, aviation personnel conducted extensive overflights and then were debriefed.

Humanitarian support missions vary considerably, but the human threat, as opposed to the natural threat—volcanoes, severe weather—will probably be of significant concern. Intelligence countermeasures will certainly include an effective terrorism awareness program and constant dissemination of information to the field. Here again, the underlying theme is to shift from a battlefield mentality by "changing gears" and to modify IPB for humanitarian support.

Final Analysis

Clearly, Special Operations forces will continue to be used in support of global humanitarian relief efforts. The whole world watched as the Special Forces reversed their traditional roles and, instead, used their skills for humanitarian support. The intelligence cycle and the collection effort as well as intelligence personnel all played a vital part in directly supporting humanitarian relief operations.

Specifically, a modified IPB worked fairly well during Operation Provide Comfort. However, not until it was over, did we fully appreciate the lessons learned, IPB's applicability, and the successes and failures of the intelligence support.

MI demonstrated its unique ability to adapt to any mission, and the Special Forces teams contributed greatly to this success. Surely, we can learn from our experience in this scenario and apply these lessons successfully in future humanitarian support operations.

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declines. These budgetary allocations reflect a dramatic shift away from the era of **quantitative** superiority in manpower and armor and toward the era of **qualitative**, technological indices of combat potential.

- ☐ Reflects changing views on nuclear war, implying that a limited nuclear scenario is possible, and **conventional** strikes on Russia's nuclear and other dangerous targets will elicit a nuclear response.
- ☐ Reflects the demise of Gorbachev's "defensive doctrine" and a shift to the conduct of all forms of military action, including "large-scale offensive operations."

Russian military doctrine thus remains highly dynamic and visionary even in the current "time of troubles."

For the near term, the new doctrine calls for rapid-response forces to prepare for local conflicts. For the long term, it calls for the development of emerging combat technologies to prepare for the new "technological war." But the future of Russia's economy and defense industries, as well as the nature of its political leadership, will serve as the final determinants of when, if ever, Russia will implement the future-oriented aspects of its new military doctrine.

At present, Russia's 1992 published doctrine proceeds from a striking civil-military consensus on the nature and requirements of future war, and directions for the near- and long-term development of Russian military art and force structure. At the same time, General Rodionov's "bold" views on the new doctrine may reflect a civil-military rift regarding the extent to which old Soviet imperial interests should be pursued. However, despite the Russian military's dominance over the development of doctrine, the political leadership (and its economic underpinnings) will likely determine the character of Russia's "vital national interests."

Endnotes

1. "The Fundamentals of Russia's Military Doctrine (Draft)," **Voennaya mysl'** (hereafter cited as **VM**), Special Edition, May 1992, 3-9.
2. General-Major I.N. Vorob'yev, "Lessons of the Persian Gulf War," **VM**, April/May 1992, 67-74.
3. "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft)," **VM**, Special Edition, November 1990, 24-28.

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the user to see where the enemy has incurred losses. This also aids predictive analysis by giving the analyst an idea of where the enemy will commit second echelon forces or his counterattack reserve. The standard "kill chart" augments the battle board in showing current enemy strength.

Other Training Media

Another easy, inexpensive training tool units use in the field is Micro Armor. This method uses enlarged scale maps made by the local print plant and a few sheets of plywood as a terrain board. One battalion S2 produced a great drop cloth map of the NTC by using an overhead projector and a reverse image transparency at 1:50,000 scale. For about $500 you can locally purchase a Soviet-style motorized rifle regiment and a friendly brigade using P2 mission or REDTRAIN funds.

Another technique to develop your intelligence analysts is to have them produce a contingency oriented battle book. The organization and research involved will train your analysts to go through the detail necessary to understand the enemy and terrain.

Assign subjects to your analysts and have them produce fact sheets. Use these to disseminate threat information within the command, where timing in critical. The commanders and staff will rarely take time to read lengthy narratives; however, by providing concise information, you can alleviate this problem while at the same time training the analyst doing the research.

We have a wealth of talented professionals under our care. This warrants the implementation of challenging unit training programs to prepare them for their unit's unique duties. These methods have endless adaptations that can be modified for your unit's METL. Producing the best intelligence begins with dynamic unit training.

Captain Jim Stockmoe is a graduate of Texas A&M University. At PGIP, he earned a master's degree in Strategic Intelligence in Soviet and European Studies. He has served as GSR platoon leader, EW platoon leader, and company commanding officer. After a tour as commander, B Company, 101st MI Battalion, 1st ID, Captain Stockmoe deployed as S2, 1st Brigade, 1st ID during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, where he continues to serve.

PHOTO OF GRAFFITI: RICHARD BYRD

By Lieutenant Colonel William V. Wenger, USAR, and First Lieutenant Fredric W. Young, USAR

> *As I (Wenger) watched in disbelief, a gang member in the car in front of me, waiting to make a left turn, shot the occupants in the cars on either side of him. I was unarmed, but quickly followed the shooters, as did several police cars, until they were apprehended 2 blocks away. I reported what I had witnessed to the police, and then drove to our headquarters armory to supervise the mobilization of my Army National Guard battalion in Inglewood, California.*

Such surreal incidents of urban combat were common in the Los Angeles riots of April and May 1992, the most deadly and costly civil disturbance in 20th century U.S. history.

During the next few days, the soldiers at our headquarters watched in amazement as fires raged all around the armory, as close as 3 blocks away. We heard the sounds of sirens and gunfire, and could see smoke and fire in all directions. We witnessed the chaos of rampant looting. The armory was under fire at one point, and periodically gang members stopped to threaten and jeer at the soldiers on guard duty.

Surrounded by this fire storm of unrest, the newly-assigned battalion intelligence officer and his small staff had to quickly develop an intelligence framework as well as methods of operation. Our battalion was the first tactical battalion mobilized, the first to deploy on the streets of Los Angeles, and the last to redeploy after 30 days of duty.

Many of the basic procedures, techniques, and reports the MI Corps uses universally worked well in this urban calamity. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), spot reports, intelligence summaries, and enemy order of battle all were useful and essential.

Information Gathering

The battalion tactical operations center, which included the S2 section, was operational within 30 minutes of the mobilization order. We immediately began to gather information using radio and television reports. In the early hours of the riots, telephone lines were often unavailable because of the heavy volume of calls throughout the area. Even cellular and pager circuits, later a primary means of communication, were too congested for use. FM communication was almost useless in this urban environment. We finally had to send an armed liaison party to the Inglewood police headquarters to get what local information was available.

During the initial IPB process, it was impossible to prepare a modified combined obstacles overlay because all of Los Angeles was a "go" area for gangs and rioters. The nature of the operations

PHOTOS OF TROOPS: PAO, 40TH ID(M) CA ARNG

and the tactical situation did not allow the preparation of an event template, doctrinal templates, a decision support template, nor a synchronization matrix. However, we were able to complete a situation overlay and a collection plan.

The situation overlay allowed us to plot the location of hundreds of fires, lootings, and shootings as they were occurring. As the operation developed and more information came in, the overlay showed curfew areas, appropriate police jurisdictional boundaries, and roads and freeways which were closed or declared danger areas. The battalion focused on company areas of operations and shooting incidents, especially those involving our soldiers.

Patterns of Activity

It was difficult, if not impossible, to predict the next trouble spot. However, as patterns of activity developed, the S2 section combined information about the locations of the most dangerous gangs with our estimates of current primary targets of opportunity. These targets included 7-11 convenience stores and auto supply, electronics, sporting goods, and shoe stores. This assessment aided field commanders in deploying assets to likely "hot" spots in the areas of operations as missions were assigned.

Evidently, we were right on target in placing local assets at critical gang targets. The Lynwood Police Department's watch commander commented to us, "If it wasn't for you guys, our city would be a smoldering heap of ash." However, in an ironic twist of fate, a Joint Task Force Los Angeles order was issued to lower the military profile throughout the Task Force area of operations. Consequently, our soldiers were withdrawn from guarding a local bank—which was robbed 20 minutes later. This sequence of events dramatizes how critical our mission was, and how valid our assessments were.

Intelligence Summaries

Within hours of activation, the battalion S2 section produced the first Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). They distributed nearly 40 INTSUMs up and down the chain of command during the riots. All the commanders used them to disseminate information on recent activities in the areas of operations, probable future actions, and the latest methods of operation. The INTSUM also served to apprise field commanders of current gang activity and of the distribution of gang propaganda leaflets urging violence. On the following page are three examples of the types of information contained in a battalion INTSUM.

The battalion deployed in widely dispersed areas. Law enforcement agencies dispatched two companies to the Wayside Honor Rancho (Prison), 40 miles north of Los Angeles, where 1,500 inmates rioted after the Rodney King verdict came in on the evening of April 29.

Delta Company reported to the Hall of Justice

BATTALION INTSUM

INTSUM #24 — HQ 3RD BN (M) 160TH INF 061400MAY92

SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY:

1. President Bush will arrive in Los Angeles tonight at 2030 hours. He will tour the riot-torn areas tomorrow and will depart Friday.

2. Mayor Bradley tours the Koreatown area today.

3. The students of Locke High School and Jordan High School were planning a walkout 1200 today in an attempt to start rioting again. Nothing has materialized so far.

ESTIMATED DURATION OF EMERGENCY: 08—09 May 92.

EXTENT OF DAMAGE:

58 dead.
3,000+ injured, at least 216 critically.
13,000 arrested.
5,537 fires.

AGENCIES COMMITTED:

No changes.

UTILITIES STATUS:

No changes.

WEATHER AND TERRAIN:

The high today will be 75 degrees and the low will be in the mid-fifties. There is a 30% chance of rain, decreasing to 20% tonight.

Fredric W. Young
1LT, MI, CA ARNG
S2

INTSUM #3 — HQ 3D BN (M) 160TH INF, 302000APR92

SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY:

1:55 Vons supermarket raided by looters—police called to respond.
1:55 Vermont blocked off.
2:00 Cameraman and reporter attacked in Compton.
2:00 Looters in Compton raid liquor store—police officer shoots looter.
2:00 Intersection of Martin Luther King (MLK) and Vermont building on fire, looters rounded up, shots fired.
2:09 39th and Normandie, new fire constant burning—no emergency units at time business burning next to homes.
2:14 Several reports of fire in San Bernadino and Riverside.
2:17 Long Beach Blvd and Arlington fire in Compton some looting reported.
2:20 2nd and Vermont, looting stores—Vons main target, mini-mall involved.
2:26 Shots fired from shotgun reported by Compton Fashion Center.
2:45 RTD ceases operation and trains at sundown.
2:47 Washington and Broadway looting activity.
2:55 Looting reported in Wilshire district—6245 Wilshire.
2:56 Crowd rushed Compton Fashion Center, police fire shots, crowd scatters, exchange gunfire between Compton P.D. and civilians.
3:10 Western near Venice—Baldwin Hills area fires.
3:19 1084 structure fires, 20-25 currently burning, firefighter, bullet lodged in neck, in stable condition.
3:43 Citizens looting 7-11 300 yards from Inglewood armory.
3:55 TV talks about federal troops.
3:55 CNG situated at Thrifties, location Figuroa and Vernon, 12 HMMVs.
4:00 Korean shop owners pull out guns and shoot at looters defending shops, persons reported shot.

SUMMARY OF FIRE	WHERE
Mini Center	MLK/Vermont
Liquor Store	39th and Normandie
Business Fires	San Bernadino and Riverside
Shoe Warehouse	Long Beach Blvd and Arlington Compton
Fedco Department Store	Rodeo and La Cienega
Shopping Center	MLK/Western
Mini-Mall	MLK/Vermont
Firefighter shot	98th and Vermont
Pep Boys	Washington and Union
Shopping Center	Compton
Restaurant (1 Blk frm Arm)	La Brea and Hazal
House Fire	MLK and Vermont
Gunfire/Fire	54th and Arlington
Crenshaw Square Med Bldg	Crenshaw and Collisium

(prison and courts building) in downtown Los Angeles to protect city and county office buildings, including Parker Center, where one of the first protest demonstrations occurred on the night of April 29. B Company deployed to East Los Angeles to secure the Whittier Boulevard area. C Company deployed to the City of Lynwood to protect businesses and citizens of Lynwood, parts of Compton, and the South Watts area. Soldiers in many of those areas were frequently fired upon with automatic weapons. The soldiers also disarmed and detained, with police assistance, many rioters during the first 36 hours.

Despite the battalion's wide deployment area (it took 12 to 15 hours to visit all company areas of operations), the battalion commander and staff, including the S2 section, frequently visited company areas of operations and talked to the commanders and to as many soldiers as possible. In addition, the S2 spent many nights in troubled areas such as Lynwood, Compton, and Watts to become familiar with the commanders' operational problems and needs.

To supplement field reports, the S2 section developed and distributed to all battalion members a spot report format specific to the riots. Later, the 40th Infantry Division

produced a tailored spot report, both in English and Spanish. The S2 section requested, or at least recorded, all spot reports in SALUTE format. The following two figures show examples of what is contained in these reports.

Order of Battle

One of the primary intelligence efforts was to assemble an enemy order of battle. When considering a Korean or Warsaw Pact opposing force scenario, analysts establish an order of battle and familiarize themselves with the hierarchy. However, gangs don't have hierarchies. And the military does not maintain records on gang-related individuals or activities. Therefore, we coordinated with the police and sheriff's department to get general gang-related information. We had to train-up fast on gang order of battle as the riot progressed.

Later, as we developed operational relationships with various law enforcement agencies, a more sophisticated, detailed picture of gang operations emerged. Soon we had general information on over 1,600 gangs and subsets, areas of operations, "tags" or graffiti used to mark turf, tactics, and types of weapons used including type and frequency of use.

The intelligence staff had the opportunity to spend considerable time with a detective at the substation of the Los Angeles Police Department South Bureau, located at the Crenshaw Mall. The detective sergeant briefed the S2 and the assigned company commanders in detail. The police operations map depicted hundreds of factions or "sets" of the two main gangs—the Crips in blue and the Bloods in red. Those marked in black were independent gang elements. All are considered armed and dangerous. As a result of the briefing, the S2 section, and subsequently the battalion commander, was much better informed.

SPOT REPORT

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS, 3/160 Infantry (Mechanized), 30 April 1992.

If you see an incident, then that incident needs to be reported to the BN S2, Lt. Young. (Phone numbers and FAX numbers.) Keep these questions in mind:

1. What is the nature and extent of the incident? Fire, looting, drive-by shooting, crowds, threats?

2. What is the location, time, and estimate of duration of the incident?

3. What is the extent of damage/destruction, and casualties in the area?

4. What conditions of potential threats can cause further damage, destruction, or casualties?

5. Are there indications of organized efforts to instigate a riot or stimulate violence?

These questions need to be answered in SALUTE format:

1. Size (how many people).
2. Activity (what are they doing).
3. Location (where is the incident).
4. Unit (is act organized).
5. Time (time of incident).
6. Equipment (what weapons).

TAILORED SPOT REPORT

40TH ID (M) G2
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES

1. THE FOLLOWING FORMAT IS FOR COLLECTION PURPOSES IN A CIVIL DISTURBANCE.

2. REPORT ALL THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR FOR DISSEMINATION UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, TO ULTIMATELY REACH THE G2 AT THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.

3. SIZE
4. LOCATION (STRUCTURE, CROSS STREETS OR ADDRESS).
5. DTG (DATE-TIME GROUP) WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED.
6. WEAPONS.
   (A) TYPE (KNIFE, CHAIN, BOMB, HAND GRENADES).
   (B) SIZE OF WEAPONS.
   (C) QUANTITY (WEAPONS AND/OR AMMO).
7. CLOTHING/HEADGEAR/FOOTWEAR.
   (A) COLOR.
   (B) TYPE.
8. CONFRONTATIONS.
   (A) TYPE OF PEOPLE (RACE, SEX, APPROX AGE).
   (B) WHAT WAS SAID—THREATS (VERBAL OR WRITTEN).
   (C) DTG (DATE-TIME GROUP).
9. SHOTS FIRED—AMOUNT.
   (A) SINGLE SHOTS.
   (B) MULTI OR SUSTAINED (AUTOMATIC OR SEMIAUTOMATIC).
10. VEHICLES.
   (A) LICENCE NUMBER.
   (B) MAKE, MODEL, COLOR.
   (C) NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS.
   (D) LOCATION/DTG (DATE-TIME GROUP).
11. COMMUNICATION/FRIENDLY.
   (A) VERBAL.
   (B) PAMPHLETS.
   (C) TV/RADIO/NEWSPAPER.

Changes in Concepts for the Future

How could tactical intelligence at a battalion level have been more effective? We suggest the following improvements be made:

Order of Battle. If possible, operational and intelligence staffs of the respective military and law enforcement units should anticipate use of military force early and maintain frequent liaison. They should develop workbooks to document local gang characteristics, such as organization and structure, territories, tactics, and weapons by type and frequency used.

High Value Targets. High value targets should be identified and plotted early, based on intelligence gathered early. Patterns eventually did emerge in the Los Angeles riots. However, we need to identify a systematic documentation for anticipated operations or trouble spots by integrating multiple intelligence sources. High value targets may include—

- ☐ Potential targets such as the Foothill Division Police Station where Rodney King was arrested or the Korean-owned Empire Liquor Market Deli on Figueroa where 15-year-old Latasha Harlins was fatally shot.
- ☐ High visibility targets, including such areas as the Martin Luther King/Drew Medical Center and the Kenneth Hahn Shopping Center, which our battalion guarded on the first nights of the riots. These are in the designated areas of operations.
- ☐ Likely targets of opportunity such as gun shops, sporting goods stores, auto parts stores, and electronic sales outlets.

Linkage of gang and looter activity could have been developed by identifying gangs with areas of operations and high value targets, and by carefully analyzing patterns.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Generally speaking, this process was difficult and required skills and techniques unusual to common battlefield tactical intelligence. During the first week of the riots, the process was hampered by a lack of satisfactory and standardized maps, and by extremely large areas of operations for units such as our battalion.

Operational planners should identify distinct, limited areas of operations. These should be specified in the Contingency Operational Plan for Civil Disturbances. A unit should be assigned to a specific area of operations. The responsible unit could then make a careful study of its area of operations before mobilizing. The unit could identify facilities for operational staging areas, command posts and temporary police headquarters, high value targets, and indigenous gangs.

Battalion and higher headquarters should thoroughly develop and maintain situational overlays. The military liaison officer should compare them with local police intelligence to develop possible patterns of future action by gang and counteraction by military forces. As mentioned, doctrinal and event templates aren't relevant in gang operations.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Military units need to coordinate with local law enforcement agencies in their designated areas of operations. They could jointly or independently plan and execute reconnaissance and surveillance to fill in critical intelligence gaps for future operations.

Focus. Unit commanders should make more judicious use of their critical, but limited, intelligence assets. In civil disturbances, it's too easy for a battalion S2 to become simply a historian. While a modicum of such information is distributed to field commanders and individual soldiers via INTSUMs, this should not become the intelligence staff's focus and function. Proactivity and projection of possible enemy activity should always be the focus and intent of the S2 section.

Unfortunately, the future of urban America, especially in large metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, will probably include more frequent civil disturbances of widespread and deadly violence. At least now we know that many basic MI techniques work well to meet the needs of tactical units in this, heretofore, uncommon scenario. We can study the innovations and lessons learned from our Army National Guard battalion's experience. We can prepare our soldiers better to defend our cities from such tragic civil unrest as the Los Angeles Riots of 1992.

Lieutenant Colonel William V. Wenger commands the 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry, 40th Infantry Division of the California Army National Guard. He earned a bachelor's degree and was commissioned from the University of California at Santa Barbara. He has a master's degree from California State University Long Beach, and one from Pepperdine University. He is a graduate of both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps Command and General Staff Colleges.

First Lieutenant Fredric W. Young is the 3d Battalion's S2. He was commissioned from the Utah Military Academy, and attended the Tactical Intelligence Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca. Lieutenant Young earned a bachelor's degree in finance from Brigham Young University, and is currently completing a master's degree at Azusa Pacific University.

Getting the Message Through:

CLANDESTINE MAIL and POSTAGE STAMPS

by Mark Sommer

In the **Art of War**, Sun-Tzu wrote, "If an army has been deprived of its morale, its general will also lose his heart." In both World War II and, more recently, the Vietnam War, intelligence services used postage stamps to undermine the morale of the enemy.

Nazi Germany

During World War II, Germany issued propaganda postage stamps in an effort to demoralize the British. Two of these imitated official British postage stamps. In one, instead of showing the head of the British king, the Germans pictured Soviet leader Stalin under the inscription, "This is a Jew[i]sh War." The other stamp bore the inscription, "SSSR Britannia" and Stalin's face, suggesting that the Soviet Union was really running the British government.

Germany also printed stamps for Subhas Chandra Bose's "*Azad Hind*" (Free India) organization. The *Azad Hind* organization opposed British control of India and sided with the Axis powers during the war. *Azad Hind* propaganda stamps show militant Indians fighting for their independence, allegories of India breaking the chains of bondage, and other scenes designed to stimulate an uprising against British rule.

The Allies

Not to be outdone by the Axis, the British Psychological Warfare Branch and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) also forged German postage stamps and issued propaganda seals. These forgeries served to defraud the German postal system, but more important, they conveyed propaganda. The most well known of these stamps was produced by the OSS. It resembled the German 12-pfenning Hitler-head stamp but showed Hitler as a skull representing death. The stamps were inscribed "*Futsches* (Finished) *Reich*" rather than "*Deutsches Reich.*" The British Psychological Warfare Branch printed a false stamp that had Himmler's, rather than Hitler's, face on it. This propaganda stamp was an attempt to divide Nazi leaders by suggesting that it was Himmler's ambition to oust Hitler and make himself dictator.

Operation Cornflakes

Operation Cornflakes was devised by Morale Operations (MO), a branch of the OSS, to bring subversive propaganda to the German breakfast table. The plan was to infiltrate the German postal system, disrupt their services, and defraud the system. This operation is described in a 1945 pamphlet, "The Story of Cornflakes, Pig Iron, and Sheet Iron." Pig iron and sheet iron refer to two programs in which propaganda was air-dropped behind German lines. Forgeries of 6- and 12-pfenning stamps were an integral part of Operation Cornflakes.

After considering a variety of plans, MO decided to begin with dropping two Hungarian mailbags carrying subversive propaganda into Hungary. Flying from Italian airfields, U.S. Army Air Force planes twice dropped mailbags filled with propaganda in 1944. The next phase of the operation, however, was much more sophisticated.

After Hungary, MO turned its eyes toward Germany and planned to drop German mail sacks into Germany itself. With the growing disruption of the German transportation system by mid-1944, MO believed that mail was inevitably misdirected and scattered about the country, and assumed that any German, upon discovering mail sacks at a recently bombed rail terminus or along a track, would turn them over to postal authorities for delivery to the proper destination. To capitalize on this confusion, MO planned to drop the propaganda-filled mail sacks alongside destroyed mail trains. As simple as this plan appeared, it required careful preparation to be successful.

In the early stages of Cornflakes, most of the problems were research and production, rather than operational. First, MO personnel had to learn as much as possible about the German postal system. They interviewed former German mail clerks at POW camps, especially about methods of packaging and labeling the mail sacks. They also studied the latest German regulations. The information was cross-checked to clarify the smallest detail.

After considerable experimentation, MO workers forged 6- and 12-pfenning stamps and printed them in Rome. Although they had their own printing facilities, they used a printing firm that had printed stamps for various Latin American countries. In addition to forging the stamps, they had to produce a large quantity of German mail sacks and sack labels.

In August 1944, the German postal system had undergone a thorough reorganization which created new postal districts and changed old cancelling devices. Each district now had a special number. This meant that MO now had to find post-August 1944 cancellations. It took weeks of searching in Rome to find enough cancellations to copy.

A fighter group of the 15th Air Force, stationed in Italy, would execute the operation. This particular group had a reputation for successful low-altitude attacks on German rail traffic in southern Germany and Austria. The Americans prepared special bombs, packing them with mail sacks, each containing about 800 letters. These bombs were designed to explode 50 feet above the target, allowing the released mail bags to reach their "targets" untorn and undamaged.

For the operation, the 15th Air Force's fighters modified their normal tactical procedures. They would look for a train with a rail car attached moving north from southern Austria. The fighters would then attack the train, destroying two or more cars and demobilizing the train. In the confusion, bombs containing the mail sacks would be dropped around the train, to be found in the debris.

For each mission, MO workers carefully coordinated the postal cancellations. They prepared and predated the cancellations in Rome and stamped them on the envelopes just before the flight. The forged stamps would be "cancelled" from a town or city along the targeted rail lines. Thus, the "mail" dropped from the fighters would seem to have come from one of those locations, making for a realistic scenario.

MO set up an entire department to handle production of everything necessary for Cornflakes, with the exception of the postage stamps. More than two million addresses and names were taken from the telephone books of such cities as Hamburg, Vienna, Dresden, Berlin, and Stuttgart. Workers used telephone books because it was impossible to get such a quantity of names and addresses elsewhere.

A staff of typists addressed more than 15,000 envelopes a week. Meanwhile, MO agents hand addressed some of the envelopes to provide a plausible mixture within each mailbag. Other personnel stuffed the envelopes and affixed the stamps.

Shortly after Cornflakes was underway, German postal officials announced a drastic change in their regulations: Henceforth, only business and official mail would be permitted through the German postal system. In response, MO reproduced envelopes from German industrial establishments in Linz, Munich, Vienna, and Berlin. When printed, these envelopes conformed to the new regulations.

Between February and April 1945, the U.S. Air Force flew 10 operations. In these missions, more than 120 mail sacks, with over 50,000 pieces of mail, had been dropped around targets inside Germany. As much as

three-fourths of the mail either came to the attention of the addressees, or at the very least to German postal officials.

Following Germany's surrender in Italy, the first interrogations of prisoners revealed that German troops did, indeed, receive these items through the German mails. About 90 percent of the prisoners believed the material either originated in Germany or came into the country from Switzerland. Prisoners reported seeing the letters as far north as the Baltic ports. Mailing these letters resulted in investigations of entire units by German counterintelligence. Some of the people involved received court-marshals.

The French Resistance

Another British plan was to forge stamps to transmit information to the French Resistance. Each of these stamps differed in some tiny detail from the original; otherwise, it was identical to the casual observer. If French Resistance fighters received a letter with a British-forged stamp, it was regarded as official instructions. If they received instructions with an authentic French stamp on the envelope, they viewed them with caution since the Germans controlled the French postal system.

Kept as one of the more guarded secrets of the Second World War, the forged stamps allowed the French Underground and the British to communicate right under the noses of the German occupiers. Few in Britain knew that the stamps being dropped by parachute along with weapons, supplies, and information were different from regular French stamps.

French underground soldiers, however, found the differences to be the difference between life and death. The following examples show the not-so-apparent differences between the legitimate and the forged stamps:

50 Centime Green: Marshal Petain's right eye has an extra eyelid, showing as a tiny white dash. This is missing on the original.

1 Franc Rose Red: The artist's name in the lower left-hand corner has letters of equal size on the original. On the British reproduction, the "M" and the "Y" of the name "Le Magny" are slightly shorter.

1 Franc 50 Centimes Red Orange: The torch consists of three simple unencumbered white lines on the original version; on the British version, the bottom line has a series of tiny notches under it.

In Vietnam

In more recent times, the CIA created bogus stamps in connection with the Vietnam War. Similar to the World War II operations, the intent was to demoralize the enemy and to defraud the North Vietnam government out of much needed funds. However, the bogus stamp operation in Vietnam had another twist. According to an article in the March 20, 1982, **Washington Post**, former CIA agent, Philip Liechty, discovered the stamp scheme by accident in the course of other work for the agency.

There continues to be conflicting information surrounding the stamp involved. Indeed, the **Post** report mentions the stamp production as a relatively minor incident in an alleged CIA operation aimed at documenting communist support of the Vietnam War. At the outset of the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong was considered to be a loyalist group from South Vietnam with no connection to the North. Allegedly, the CIA attempted, through this bogus stamp operation, to establish evidence of the Viet Cong's connection with North Vietnam.

The stamp in question is one of a number of stamp issues attributed to the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam—the Viet Cong. Leichty reportedly claims the stamp production was a highly professional job. The article continues, "the very professionalism required to produce the multicolor stamp was meant to indicate that it was produced by the North Vietnamese because the Viet Cong would not have had such capabilities." By making the stamp

look like it had been printed in North Vietnam, the CIA could, thereby, produce proof that the North was supporting the Viet Cong.

A full-color enlargement of the stamp was pictured on the cover of **Life** magazine on February 26, 1965, 2 days before the Johnson administration published its "White Paper" on the fighting in North Vietnam, called "Aggression from the North," the **Post** article said.

The original stamp was reported in the March 1964 issues of three philatelic publications: the **American Philatelist**, **Philately** magazine, and the Japanese philatelic magazine **Yushu**.

It would have been a major triumph for the CIA if they had printed the stamps as a propaganda device and were able to attribute production to the North Vietnamese. Even Asian newspapers reported the stamps and credited them to North Vietnamese sources.

Unfortunately, that possibility raises more questions. Another stamp of the same value was produced and publicized at the same time by most media reports. It shows a devastated village scene.

Because of the contemporary media coverage and documentation, it is likely that the CIA stamps, if, indeed, any were planned, were propaganda forgeries of an issue already in existence.

The stamps in question were apparently issued in late 1963, although no specific date is known. They were regarded for years as "local postage" for use by the Viet Cong in occupied areas of South Vietnam and did not appear in stamp catalogs as legitimate post issues until the late seventies.

The status of the Viet Cong stamps remains in some doubt, although copies of the issues do not appear to be scarce. Stamp catalog editors apparently were satisfied with the postal use of the stamps, and thus have afforded them the catalog status.

Two issues, consisting of five stamps, were released by the Viet Cong in late 1963. The first marked the third anniversary of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. While the other two may have been released separately to mark the same anniversary, but depicted war scenes.

Summary

Propaganda stamps are currently found in other countries of the world, such as Angola and Namibia. Propaganda stamps are also issued by the African National Congress of South Africa. The Polish Solidarity labor union issued propaganda stamps that ridiculed the government of General Jaruzelski. Some of these propaganda stamps are occasionally affixed to letters to embarrass the government. They also serve as revenue-raising items for the Movement. Recently, questions have arisen concerning which issues were actually produced by Solidarity and which may or may not have been issued as anti-Solidarity propaganda by the Polish government to divert funds to their own coffers.

Success is questionable in some of these ventures, but some of them have proven to be quite successful, as demonstrated by the World War II operations. Also, I believe there is no reason this method of achieving political objectives could not be used again. Of course, it would take special planning, and require someone with a philatelic background to help "legitimize" the stamps.

The information presented here is merely an overview for the non-stamp collector and should not be construed as original research nor as a definitive study on my part. For anyone interested, numerous research articles by those more intimate with this study have been published in various philatelic journals.

Mark Sommer has a bachelor's degree from Yeshiva University and a master's degree in International Relations from Fairleigh Dickinson University. He was an independent philatelic consultant before teaching in the Social Sciences Department at Touro College in New York City and at Mercy College in Dobbs Ferry, New York, where he teaches English as a Second Language.

VANTAGE POINT *(Continued from page 2)*

GSM is ready for fielding, and will be conducted at Fort Huachuca and at the National Training Center (NTC) with live JSTARS coverage of NTC Rotation 93-03.

During the same time frame, we will also evaluate a Moving Target Indicator sensor package for the UAV-Short Range on a noninterference basis with the JSTARS LUT and the NTC rotation. At the same time, using this same NTC rotation as a target of opportunity, we also are planning an expanded collection exercise called Operation Desert Capture to get insights into what sensors and formats we need to incorporate into the prototype Common Ground Station.

We have been working with field units to increase intelligence support to the CTCs and major exercises to demonstrate new capabilities and our seamless system of intelligence systems focused on supporting the warfighter. In July, we finished a series of major exercises which accomplished our objective and included—

- ☐ A III Corps Contingency Operation Exercise at NTC.
- ☐ USAREUR's and V Corps' Exercise Dragon Hammer.
- ☐ XVIII Airborne Corps' Joint Readiness Exercise Ocean Venture.
- ☐ An I Corps Contingency Operation Exercise Cascade Pine at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

Systems incorporated into these exercises included Trojan Spirit, Hawkeye/Warrior, the Tactical High Mobility Terminal, and FAST-I. INSCOM also supported each with a Corps MI Support Element. In a related development, INSCOM initiated live national imagery support to the I Corps/25th Infantry Division rotation at the JRTC in July. INSCOM's Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center did the imagery analysis and then disseminated annotated digital imagery to the JRTC. This will now be done on a recurring basis at JRTC.

The JSTARS TRADOC system manager, in cooperation with U.S. Forces Korea, the JSTARS program manager, and the DA staff, developed a high fidelity JSTARS simulation to support ULCHI Focus Lens 92. The simulation interoperates with the tactical simulator (TACSIM) to convert ground truth data into moving target indicator radar returns on a prototype workstation monitor. As a result of this effort, we can now provide high fidelity JSTARS input into any TACSIM-driven exercise. The JSTARS TRADOC system manager is also working with Fort Leavenworth to integrate this simulation into the battle command training program; this should be done by the third quarter of FY 93.

In August the contractor for JSTARS GSM demonstrated a HMMWV-mounted GSM capable of receiving satellite-transmitted JSTARS data on the move. This essential capability will enable us to hit any commander or staff element on the move with retransmitted JSTARS data from any stationary GSM with a satellite transmit capability (LST-5 or Trojan Spirit). We are also working with the Army Space Program Office to develop a new antenna which will enable us to receive multiple direct downlinks, including JSTARS directly from the aircraft, in a moving GSM.

In July, DA's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel approved consolidation of our aviation-related electronic maintenance MOSs 33R and 33V into MOS 33R, Aviation Systems Repairer. We now have consolidated six electronic maintenance MOSs into three. Several other potential MOS consolidations are being staffed, including MOSs 98D, 98H, and 98K into MOS 98M, Multimode Collector; and MOSs 97B and 97E into MOS 97H, Human Intelligence Operator. These consolidations not only provide us the training economies and assignment flexibility we need in a smaller Army, but also give us more viable MOSs for our soldiers.

I have approved our new **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**, and **FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations**. The former not only tells combined arms commanders what we can and cannot do for them, but also explains their role in focusing and prioritizing our efforts. **FM 34-8** is now being printed and should have been distributed to the field in September. **FM 34-7** has been sent to the Combined Arms Command for final approval. It provides MI units and staffs the tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting intelligence and electronic warfare operations in a low-intensity conflict (LIC) environment, including how to conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) for LIC.

Following Desert Storm, Major General Jenkins, USMC, visited the Intelligence Center to discuss the possibility of training Marine officers here. After observing our officer courses, he identified our MI Officer Transition Course (MIOTC)—a 7-week course designed to train branch transfers and MI officers coming off combat arms detail—as the best course for Marine officers to attend. Two Marine officers attended our last MIOTC, and 10 are attend-

ing the present course. Two Marine officers in the present MIOTC course will go on to attend our Advanced Course. At Marine's request, we also sent a Mobile Training Team to Camp Pendleton, California, in June to provide 3 days of instruction on IPB and the Intelligence Estimate. The training was well received, and the Marines have asked for a repeat expanded to 5 days of training for their officers at Twenty-Nine Palms.

As you can see, our MI Corps is moving forward toward an exciting and productive future. The new, more capable family of intelligence systems and more focused training are the cornerstones of progress. I have every confidence that we will be prepared to support a wide range of contingencies worldwide and that we can meet any challenge successfully. The articles in MIPB are designed to give you some insights into what we are doing at the Intelligence Center and what you must do as MI professionals to prepare for the future. The challenges we face are imposing, indeed, but with your continued help we will meet them and will remain the key to victory on any battlefield, now and in the future.

NOTICE TO 97G SOLDIERS

Counter-Signals Intelligence soldiers have their first Soldier's Manual, STP-34-97G14-SM-TG, available through the Army's initial pinpoint distribution procedures process. Commanders should order these manuals so that soldiers can study for the test scheduled in August. Use DA Form 4569 to order and include "000" as the change number and "EA" as unit of issue. Submit requests for future requirements on DA Form 12-11E, Block Number 4917, to commander, U.S. Army Publication and Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Blvd., Baltimore, MD, 21220-2896. DSN number is 584-2533. Point of contact is SFC Gray, ATZS-TDI-T, DSN 879-2208/6105, commercial (602) 538-2208/6105.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 5)

forget this business. You'll be frustrated and routinely confronted with conflicting information, partial answers, gray areas, situations that don't match the Huachuca school solution, and the inability to find the one person who can give you the answer. You'll have to sift through bits and pieces of seemingly trivial minutiae, think about what you have and don't have, and then present your conclusions based on incomplete information. The investigation won't be completed in a 50-minute school period or a 30-minute TV show. It may have started before you came to your unit and may not be finished until after you PCS.

The Clyde Conrad case was a textbook example of a successful CI investigation that found the proverbial needle in the haystack based on the slimmest of leads. The investigation took a decade to bring to resolution; 10 years of frustration, blind alleys, false starts and restarts, sources that lied, and the inevitable application of Murphy's Law at the worst possible times.

My comments, much like Major Smith's article, concentrate on the traditional aspects of the CI business —pavement-pounding, doorbell-ringing, investigative work that has not really changed in the last 2,000 years. But, what about those changes mentioned earlier?

Technology, in its broadest sense and from several perspectives, is the CI agents' playing field of today.

Many are engaged in protecting our sensitive research and development programs—programs that led to the "smart weapons" that helped win the war against Iraq. The security support they provide is important because it provides our field commanders the element of surprise when they unveil a weapon or capability the enemy didn't know we had. It also prevents the enemy (and those who aren't our enemy today, but may be tomorrow) from taking advantage of our R&D programs to develop their own weapons, or countermeasures to ours. CI agents are also involved in a continuing effort to prevent our technology from getting into the wrong hands.

Computer espionage is one of the greatest threats we face. It's an area that is consuming more of the CI agent's time. Add the security vulnerabilities of our existing communications systems to the security vulnerabilities of our ADP systems (since everybody wants to net their computers) and factor in the fact that virtually any computer-literate person can go to a local computer store and buy the capability to play hacker and you have the potential for disaster. There are no geographic limitations. We've seen hackers in Europe, through the international communications systems, try to enter our ADP systems and data bases in the United States, sometimes successfully. Then comes the interesting question for the CI agent. Is this an amateur hacker playing around, or is this person working for a foreign intelligence service, and does it make a difference?

Before we leave this issue, let's not forget those security vulnerabilities with our communications systems. CI still has a sizeable challenge in trying to counter the American tendency to talk our heads off every time we get on the telephone or radio. This line of work is pure frustration.

Lastly, CI agents are involved in combatting one of the greatest threats to our nation—drugs. This is obviously not classical, traditional CI, but it has one thing in common with those espionage investigations we talked about earlier. It's a mission that demands the dedication and perseverance of our best people. The end result is saving lives. That's what this business is all about.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. James
Fort Belvoir, VA

PROPONENT NOTES

Officer Notes

We are pleased to report that the Department of the Army approved the Fiscal Year 93 Officer Development Program, and incorporated the MI Must Fill in its entirety. The overall officer fill rate for MI authorizations is 90 percent. However, we still have severe shortages in field grade ranks. Our field grade fill rate is 73 percent, and our company grade rate is 102 percent. This means that some company grade upward substitutions will be needed to fill vacant field grade authorizations. Senior intelligence officers will ensure critical positions (must fill) are filled with officers of appropriate grade. As we move toward 1995, fill rates will be 67 percent for field grade and 108 percent for company grade, with an overall rate of 91 percent.

For FY 93, MI Branch cannot accept Category 3 (not RIF eligible or one-time nonselect) resignations. They can accept other category resignations, but in a smaller time window. FY 93 company and field grade RIF boards meet in February.

We are creating a new Skill Identifier, SI F4, for RC 12K/N GUARDRAIL Common Sensor pilots—15C35 and 155 officers. Initial coordination with the Aviation Proponent and the MI Proponent has already taken place. The new SI should be written into the regulations by October 1993.

Area of Concentration 35C is undergoing a complete scrub to determine officer imagery training requirements and the role of officers in imagery intelligence positions. This is being coordinated with all affected Army and defense organizations.

The Proponent has finalized the rewrite of the MI Chapter in AR 611-101, Commissioned Officer Classification System. This Army regulation will be distributed to the field in April in an update to the DA Circular 611 series, Military Occupational Classification Structure.

Enlisted Notes

In these times of transition, soldiers must be proactive and stay abreast of changes that may affect their careers. As we visit with soldiers, we often get questions about issues that have already been discussed and disseminated to major commands and MI brigades by message traffic. Unfortunately, some of this information isn't filtering down to the individual soldier. Commanders and NCOs must push career information down to their soldiers as soon as they get it. Soldiers need to ask their NCOs questions; NCOs, in turn, must get answers from the chain of command. We urge senior intelligence officers and commanders at all levels to inform their soldiers of any career information that comes to them in message traffic.

Some soldiers are too complacent in the face of new career policies and regulations. Yes, the Army will take care of its own; however, soldiers must also take care of themselves. For example, soldiers serving in an overage MOS should realize they may have to choose between changing their MOS or separating sooner than their projected ETS date. Too often soldiers ask, "What's the Army going to do, kick me out?" Be assured, soldiers will be taken care of and not "kicked out." But they must take responsibility for their own careers and make timely decisions, when there are options. Of course, doing nothing is an option too and an individual choice, but it could result in an undesirable outcome.

Don't gamble with your future. Spread the word. Tell your friends and peers to be aware of changes that could affect their careers. Encourage them to ask questions and get answers so they can act in time. If you think you're not being told about the latest changes, ask the NCO support channel and chain of command to conduct information briefings on pertinent changes. We encourage you to attend scheduled chain teaching briefings and ask questions about how your MOS may be affected. As the Army becomes smaller, we must stay informed in order to make the right decisions.

In past MIPB issues we've mentioned that MOS consolidation efforts are underway. To produce a language primacy MOS, we're exploring the feasibility of consolidating 98D, 98H, and 98K into one MOS. And for those interested in the future of 33R and 33V, DA approved the 33R consolidation in June. The new title is MOS 33R, Aviation Systems Repairer. The changes in major duties, tasks, and standards of grade authorization are—

- ☐ ASI 2L, Aerial Sensor Repair, is established. DA awards this when the soldier completes current 33V Phase II training at Fort Huachuca. Phase II becomes an ASI-producing functional course.

- ☐ Former 33V soldiers who need transition training to be 33R-qualified will receive ASI Y2.

With new technology coming on-line, such as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, the future looks promising for 33Rs.

Language Notes

MI linguists must also be alert to changes in language requirements generated by the Army's downsizing and changing world events. If a linguist has a surplus foreign language skill but wants to stay in MI, or any other branch of the Army, he or she needs to make career decisions now. The following options may be available by submitting DA Form 4187, through the local chain of command to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, ATTN: TAPC-EPL-M, Alexandria, Virginia 22332:

- ☐ Retain the MOS but retrain in a shortage language.
- ☐ Retain the language but reclassify and retrain into a language and hostage MOS, such as 97B or 95D.
- ☐ Reclassify to a nonlanguage MI MOS.
- ☐ Reclassify to a non-MI MOS.
- ☐ Seek a Defense Attache System (DAS) assignment that requires a change of MOS and possibly retraining to another language. It may be possible to revert back to MOS 98G or retain the administrative DAS MOS when your initial DAS tour is finished.

We're working with the Department of Human Intelligence at Fort Huachuca to develop a new MOS for HUMINT soldiers which will focus on language skills. The new MOS will probably combine CI and HUMINT skills.

The Proponent forwarded to DA the RC 97L MOS proposal to create a pool of highly skilled translators and interpreters. We have every reason to believe DA will approve the proposal.

For more information on any of these issues, call OCMI, AV 821-1975, DSN 853-1975, or commercial (602) 533-1975.

JOINT MERITORIOUS UNIT AWARD TO MI BATTALION (LOW INTENSITY)

On July 16, the commander of Joint Task Force Four announced that the MI Battalion (LI) was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award (JMUA). All members of Headquarters Service Company, Headquarters Service Detachment, A Company, and C Company assigned from April 6, 1991 through April 30, 1992, are authorized to wear the JMUA ribbon.

The citation states that Joint Task Force Four and its assigned units distinguished themselves by exceptionally meritorious service in fulfilling DOD Counter-Drug obligations within the U.S. Atlantic Command area of responsibility.

Using the skills, determination, experience, and individual motivation of thousands of multiservice personnel, the Joint Task Force set new standards in establishing coordination and communication links between DOD agencies, the law enforcement community, and foreign governments, eliciting superior cooperation and improving the flow of vital information. Assigned units maintained the highest peacetime operational tempo in our nation's history, and were directly responsible for the detecting and monitoring activities that led to the interdiction of over 70 tons of contraband.

For A Company soldiers, this is the second award (First Oak Leaf Cluster) of this prestigious recognition. All personnel assigned to these four MI Battalion companies may wear the JMUA ribbon now. Authority for the award, and adjustment to individual Military Personnel Records Jacket and DA Form 2-1 is CJTF FOUR message 161500Z July 1992, subject: Award of the JMUA to Joint Task Force Four. For more information, call the MI Battalion (LI) Adjutant at DSN 791-3500, commercial (407) 623-3500, or write Commander, MI Battalion (LI), 4215 Airtrade Street, Orlando, FL 32827.

CAREER NOTES

The Distributed Training Program

The Distributed Training Program (DTP) is an Army initiative to modernize institutional training and maintain its technical edge into the 21st Century, while, at the same time, improving unit readiness. DPT uses advanced training technologies, such as computer-based instruction, video tape, and video teletraining, and distributes lessons to the field. DTP permits individuals to pursue preresident, self-development, leader development, and sustainment training at their home stations.

Currently, DTP is in the Proof-of-Principle Phase. The Army selected several proponent school courses as pilots for reconfiguration and distribution. Courses being tested, using the preresident concept, include 12 BNCOCs, 4 ANCOCs, and 8 OACs. Initially, pilots will consist of resident lessons reconfigured for distribution using printed instructional material. Later, pilots will use advanced training technologies to modernize, improve, and enhance resident instruction and to distribute courseware to the field.

With DTP, all students entering the Intelligence Center's resident instruction will have a common base of knowledge gained during preresident instruction. This will reduce student frustration and the boredom associated with repeating material already mastered by some, yet new to others. DTP is similar to the Army Correspondence Course Program, except lessons contain material extracted from the Intelligence Center's resident curricula. Individuals already familiar with the distributed subject matter only have to review it and take a test to certify their knowledge of the course material. Other students less familiar with the course material can follow the study plan and learn it at their own pace.

Because of DTP, students arriving at the Intelligence Center's resident course will know more about the material. They'll be able to "hit the ground running" and proceed at a rate that will stimulate, motivate, and challenge all of the students. DTP will also help soldiers perform their duties more effectively in their units.

Beginning with Class 1-93 (January 12, 1993), the Intelligence Center will implement a DTP pilot for both the 96B30 and 97B30 track of the BNCOC. Students scheduled to attend this class will receive a preresident package of instructional material covering about 40 hours of current BNCOC instruction. Students should receive this material at least 20 weeks before attending the course, and must complete the lessons and tests before attending the resident course. The Intelligence Center is presently working on two additional MOSs—the 96D30 and 97E30 track BNCOC—for implementation in FY 94.

For more information, contact the Army Distributed Training Office, ATSC, Fort Eustis, Virginia, DSN 927-2043, commercial (804) 878-2043; or phone Sergeant First Class Gary Nado, DSN 821-3365, commercial (602) 533-3365.

Functional Area (FA) 53 Update

The Army Signal Center's Computer Science School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, is developing a new course for FA 53 (Systems Automation) officers. The Systems Automation Course (SAC) II prepares FA 53 officers, currently serving in branch related assignments, for upcoming FA 53 assignments. This course will quickly bring officers up-to-date on current automation technology and Army automation issues. It also trains them in the critical skills required in their next assignment.

SAC II is a quarterly course and is 4 weeks and 4 days long. Officers should attend it en route to their next FA 53 assignment. The first course date is January 1993. To attend the course, an officer must be on orders to an FA 53 assignment; be a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel; and have served outside FA 53 for at least the last 3 years.

For more information, contact Captain Prantl at DSN 780-3236. To request seats in this course or other FA 53 assignment information, contact Major Welch at DSN 221-2759.

TOTAL FORCE

By Colonel Joseph T. Mesch and Lieutenant Colonel David Miner

The Expansible Battalion: An Idea for the 90's

The MI Proponent convened the Reserve Components (RC) panel of the MI RELOOK for several sessions this summer. Our purpose was to execute the directive from the Army Chief of Staff: "...the U.S. Army Intelligence Center...develop an action plan which integrates the Expansible CEWI Battalion concept into the overall MI RC strategy."

We in the MI Proponent are excited about this innovative effort that will protect our MI RC force structure and provide an early deploying pool of MI linguists. Basically, we're executing an action plan with 11 specific, yet interrelated, tasks. Our mission is to—

1. Document a TO&E for an Expansible RC CEWI battalion that retains the doctrinal CEWI battalion's skeletal structure and representative capabilities, yet removes as many language positions and as much associated signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment as possible.

2. Document linguist detachment TO&Es using language positions removed from the existing RC CEWI battalions.

On Issues 1 and 2, the Proponent is working with the Combined Arms Command to both document and integrate the process to the MI RELOOK.

3. Build into the Expansible RC CEWI battalion structure the minimum amount of SIGINT equipment required for in-unit training and training support to parent Army National Guard divisions.

On Issue 3, we are absolutely committed to making sure each National Guard division has a robust MI battalion that can be trained in peacetime and expansible—"full-up"—in war.

4. Document the consolidation of SIGINT equipment removed from the existing RC CEWI battalions at Equipment Concentration Sites or Regional Training Sites-Intelligence. This will centralize maintenance and training, and support mobilization.

5. Document the process for reintegration of linguists and equipment into the Expansible RC CEWI battalions upon mobilization.

6. Document the language mix of linguist detachments based on their share of the Total Army language requirement.

7. Document the CAPSTONE relationships of linguist detachments based on operational requirements.

On Issues 6 and 7, RELOOK is working with HQDA to ensure the appropriate mix of language shortfall is provided and soldiers already language fluent in the required languages are assigned to a language detachment.

8. Document the locations of linguist detachments based on a demographic survey that identifies those geographic areas where civilian acquired language skills are abundant.

On Issue 8, we're working with the Army Recruiting Command to make sure we place the detachments in areas where we can easily fill recruitment quotas from the local population.

9. Develop personnel assignment programs that transcend geography in the recruitment of skilled prior-service soldiers and language qualified civilians.

10. Develop a training program that focuses on language proficiency, while addressing collective training, common soldier skills, and MI technical skills.

On Issues 9 and 10, the CAR (Chief, Army Reserve) has approved the establishment of a management cell at the Army Personnel Center in St. Louis, known as the MI Augmentation Detachment (MIAD). This team will be under the control of the DCSINT of the Army Reserve Command, U.S. Army Reserve Center. However, it will work out of the Army Personnel Center taking full advantage of the Reserve Personnel Center's automation and crisis management skills. Language sustainment and military language skills training will be MIAD's key missions.

11. Develop a SIGINT equipment maintenance program that supports training and mobilization requirements.

Participating in the RELOOK were DCSOPS, DCSINT, and the National Guard Bureau from

HQDA; TRADOC/CAC, FORSCOM, USARC/OCAR, and AMC from the major Army commands; and the MI Proponent.

As you can see by the diversity of participants, we had to work together to produce a finished product. By integrating this effort into an already functioning MI RELOOK, we will be able to implement these changes through the Army system for change—our bureaucracy.

Let me answer some of the naysayers who say we're fixing our RC MI divisional battalions with systems already in place, such as equipment coming on line and with the many Active Component soldiers transitioning to the RC.

We must face reality. The Cold War is over, and our mission and corresponding structure must change. We can't depend on the Defense Language Institute for Russian, German, and Slavic languages from the old Warsaw Pact. However, we do need to recruit shortfall languages such as Korean, Tagalog, Vietnamese, Thai, Ukrainian, Portuguese, Swahili, and other contingency required languages.

Be assured, however, the Expansible MI battalion will continue to support her CAPSTONE Guard division. The language detachments will mobilize to "expand" the battalion when mobilized. The battalion will have the required MI slice needed during peacetime training so Guard divisions will have intelligence support.

The exciting part of this concept is recruiting citizens already fluent in languages the Army needs, and making them citizen-soldiers. This makes a great deal of sense especially when you consider some of the findings of the 1990 census:

- ☐ Of the 250,000,000 people in the United States, some 32,000,000 speak a language other than English at home.
- ☐ Nearly 9,000,000 legal immigrants came to America during the 1980's.
- ☐ More than 35 percent of the residents of New Mexico speak a language other than English at home.
- ☐ Some 22 percent of Californians were born in another country.

Clearly, the United States has been and continues to be a nation of immigrants. Many of our new immigrants are highly educated and professionally trained. They are joining pools of other immigrants from previous generations whose sons and daughters are proud citizens of this land. These citizens are also proud of their heritage and are retaining their ethnic language. We are wisely taking advantage of this situation to recruit these citizens and improve our "militia."

Of course, we will be concerned with clearances. Yet, many of these slots, especially those for 97L—the new language MOS for the RC—will only require a secret clearance.

The bottom line is that the MI Proponent, through our RELOOK, is structuring an Expansible MI battalion that supports Guard divisions, yet has MI language detachments able to be mobilized to an MI unit based on language shortfalls.

Senior Leaders Courses: Fiscal Year 1993 Pre-Command Course and Pre-Assignment Course Schedule

Commanders, command sergeants major, G2s, and senior staff from the RC MI community are benefitting from one of the best seminar courses the MI schoolhouse provides at Huachuca. We encourage all of you to take full advantage of the program. We have scheduled four sessions of the Pre-Command Course and three classes of the Pre-Assignment Course. You can reserve a PCC quota through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), and the PAC slots through Huachuca fill.

Following is the PCC and G2 schedule: Class 93-02, 19-30 OCT 92; Class 93-03, 10-30 JAN 93; Class 93-06, 22 MAR-2 APR 93; Class 93-08, 3-14 MAY 93. For more information on these classes, contact Ken Welch at DSN 879-0750.

PAC and command sergeants major schedule is the same as the PCC on the January, April, and May dates. Master Sergeant Thornby is the point of contact at DSN 879-8935.

Colonel Joe Mesch and Lieutenant Colonel Dave Miner work Reserve Forces issues at the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. You can reach them at DSN 821-1176/1177, commercial (602) 533-1176/1177, or write, ATTN: ATZS-RA. They encourage readers to write letters to the editor.

HOTLINE

The Training and Doctrine Command Soldier Systems Manager, located at Fort Benning, Georgia, has established a soldier hotline. The 24-hour hotline was established because the Army relies heavily on field input in its efforts to modernize doctrine, equipment, and support for the soldier.

The hotline gives soldiers and commanders a voice in deciding what a soldier wears, carries, or consumes in a tactical environment. Call **1-800-722-6748** to give us your recommendations to improve battlefield capabilities of lethality, command and control, survivability, sustainment, and mobility.

TRAINING NOTES

Educating the Professional Intelligence Soldier

By Master Sergeant Michael W. Hudson

The world of H.G. Wells and Buck Rogers is upon us, and Star Trek and Star War's "technology" is already edging toward reality. Ten years ago, when the Commodore 128 personal computer surpassed the 64, we found out that "Space really is the final frontier." Where will we be 10 years from now? Will our leaders be able to teach and mentor future leaders who can see 10 years into their future?

Tomorrow's Army will be smaller and intensely high-tech. This Army will need MI soldiers who not only are experts in one discipline, but also have a thorough knowledge of all the other intelligence disciplines. To be really effective, MI soldiers will have to understand our increasingly complex world and how politics, economics, culture, language, and a host of other elements interrelate. They will need to be able to see the "big picture" and how they fit into it. They will be computer smart, and able to operate communications systems that are more complex (and easier to use) than anything we're using today. In the future, MI soldiers will work in environments only imagined today

The question is what can the Army do now to acquire or develop this super MI soldier? The answer lies in four critical areas:

- ☐ Education.
- ☐ Quality assignments after graduation.
- ☐ Retention in the intelligence community after graduation.
- ☐ A self-development program geared toward the future.

Today's staff sergeants, warrant officers, and captains are the future leaders and technicians. Their job is to become well educated and, through self-development programs, to continue to update their skills and knowledge. Our job is to ensure that, after earning their degrees, they receive quality assignments; to motivate them to stay in MI; and to encourage them to pursue self-development programs. How else can they develop and excel as intelligence professionals.

Education

MI soldiers, throughout the ranks, can achieve this first step in the process by getting a bachelor of science degree in intelligence, and ultimately, a master's degree in strategic intelligence. To some, this may seem unrealistic; however, the Defense Intelligence College (DIC) has already developed programs that enable soldiers, from all military branches, to earn bachelor's and master's degrees in intelligence.

These programs are not meant to take the place of professional and technical development. However, they will expand the intelligence professional's knowledge at all levels. In 1980, Congress authorized the DIC to offer a master of science degree in strategic intelligence (MSSI). The MSSI was created to strengthen intelligence as a profession because our nation needs highly qualified and educated intelligence professionals at the national level.

We are awaiting Congressional approval which will allow the DIC to offer a bachelor of science degree in intelligence (BSI). The BSI was developed to give junior grade military and civilians in intelligence the knowledge and skills needed to be of maximum service. Graduates of these courses will have a comprehensive knowledge of the needs, processes, and uses of defense intelligence at all levels.

The standards for the two programs are tough—but they need to be. The Personnel Command sends out a message each October to all Army Commands outlining specific admission criteria and retention requirements. Basically, the applicant must—

- ☐ Be a civilian or military professional.
- ☐ Be nominated by his or her parent organization.
- ☐ Have an associate's degree plus 20 hours for the BSI, and a baccalaureate degree for the MSSI.
- ☐ Have Top Secret and SCI security clearances.

The chain of command can request a waiver of the education requirements. However, commanders should know that the DIC is an accredited educational institution and normal graduation criteria apply.

Both courses are open to—

- ☐ NCOs in the 96 and 98 Career Management Fields (staff sergeants and above).
- ☐ Warrant officers in the 350, 351, and 352 Areas of Concentration.
- ☐ MI Branch commissioned officers.

Not only must the applicant meet stringent requirements, but the chain of command needs to ensure that only qualified soldiers apply. The chain of command is an important player in achieving the ultimate goal: an educated and skilled MI force in the future. Part of its responsibility is to look at future requirements and to identify positions in its organizations that graduates of either course could fill.

The BSI course of study takes 41 weeks and is projected to accommodate up to 160 people per session. Located in Washington, D.C., the college adheres to the same standards required of any other Army educational institution. Because of limited facilities, specifically housing, soldiers wishing to apply should do so early enough to secure adequate housing.

Quality Assignments

The second part of the process is making sure intelligence professionals get quality assignments after graduation. Commanders at all levels can use DIC graduates. Their knowledge in a specific country or area can be of great value to tactical and strategic commanders. As mentioned previously, commands should request graduates of the DIC, and request soldiers who's area of concentration relate to the command's mission. Assignment managers at PERSCOM select soldiers for the DIC and continue to stay on top of the soldier's progress.

Retention

The third part of the process is retention. Ideally, MI professionals who complete these courses will stay in MI. Since formal education isn't free, the Army requires graduates to reenlist or extend for a set period of time after graduation. In addition, the BSI graduate has other incentives to stay in Army intelligence—for example, they can earn an MSSI degree, get into the Warrant Officer Career Program, or apply for a commission. They must reeinlist (for enlisted) or commit (for warrant officers and officers).

Self-Development

The final step in this process is self-development. Soldiers should continue to pursue civilian education either by attending formal college classes or reading professional magazines and books related to the intelligence field and technological advancements. Reading material should encompass socioeconomics, culture, religion, and other job-related, though nonmilitary, subjects.

The concept of educating our MI soldiers and providing a degree at the same time has come of age. It's a jumping off point for available and future training and educational opportunities needed to support our military in the future. In addition, educated professionals can pass their skills and knowledge on to fellow soldiers in all forums, not just in the formal schoolhouse environment.

For additional information on these courses, contact the OCMI, DSN 821-1184.

Master Sergeant Michael Hudson is a Proponency System Manager at OCMI. Recent assignments include first sergeant, Company B, 304th MI Battalion; operations sergeant, Allied Command Europe, COMSEC Activity; and platoon sergeant, 124th MI Battalion. Master Sergeant Hudson earned a bachelor's degree from the University of Maryland, and is a graduate of the Sergeants Major Academy.

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PROFESSIONAL READING

Military Intelligence
PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN
BOOK REVIEWER'S GUIDE

The **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** publishes book reviews on new books relating to military intelligence topics. These reviews help our readers decide if the book is worth reading.

Publishers furnish us with review copies of books, and reviewers may request a list of those available. Reviewers may keep any book they review. Here are some guidelines on how to write a book review.

Reviewing the book: For **MIPB** purposes, reviewers should answer four questions:

1. **Is the book worthwhile**? Make a recommendation: Why should an MI professional read this book? Avoid terms like "a must read."

2. **What does the book say**? Don't make your review simply a summary of the book. Give a general idea of what the book is about. What is the author's thesis? What are the parameters of the subject?

3. **How good a book is it**? How well does the author support the thesis? Evaluate the quality of the writing, sources, and factual content. Does the author say anything new?

4. **What can the MI professional get out of the book**? Tell the readers what they, as MI professionals, can expect to find of value in the book.

Length: Most reviews should be limited to about **two double-spaced typed pages**. Don't be afraid of writing less if the work merits less. Books of major MI significance may run up to three pages.

Time: So that we can publish the review in a timely manner, send in your review **within 60 days** after receiving the book.

If you have any questions, please call **MIPB** at DSN 879-0797 or commercial (602) 538-0797, or write to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

GOOD READING!

Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait by Norman Friedman (Annapolis, MD: The Naval Institute Press, 1991), 435 pages, $18.95.

Written as a survey, this book is an important step in understanding the Persian Gulf War. It's useful for both the military professional and the general reader. Friedman, a civilian defense analyst, not only gives an informative account of the stunning victory, but also offers insight into how and why we won so decisively. He argues that the victory "can be ascribed to both U.S. prowess and to Saddam Hussein's ineptitude." Didactic in tone, Friedman concludes by drawing interesting and perceptive lessons.

The first two-thirds of the book is a readable, probing narrative of the conflict at strategic and operational levels. After briefly describing the Iraqi military and its invasion of Kuwait, Friedman covers the U.N. embargo and Desert Storm buildup, and then outlines air, naval, and ground operations. This book, however, is more than just a chronology of events. Friedman often digresses to explain techniques or give background information so readers can better understand decisions and events. To his narrative, Friedman adds eight appendixes which give encyclopedic treatment to the opposing forces and their weapons and doctrine.

Friedman recognizes that the war itself was unique and many details remain unknown. Nevertheless, he believes we can draw lessons from the Gulf War. He states that, while superior weapons and crushing air power helped defeat Iraq, "less visible reasons" account for the victory. Iraqi deficiencies and the U.N. coalition's superiority in training, command and control, and logistics, Friedman argues, resulted in the remarkable victory. "The great lesson," Friedman states, "is not new but easily forgotten. People, well-trained and well-led, win wars. Weapons help, but they don't decide the issue."

In his analysis, Friedman highlights the dilemma facing U.S. intelligence in future regional conflicts. He argues that good intelligence requires thorough knowledge of both a country's motivations and intentions, and its measurable resources. With limited resources, U.S. intelligence will have difficulty gaining in-depth information on the

Third World. Moreover, having largely dispensed with HUMINT in favor of satellite imagery, the intelligence community is limited to gathering only the more concrete information. Friedman relates the telling anecdote of an Air Force analyst who said he would have given up all his photos for one spy on the ground.

Friedman and his publishers should be commended for their quick production of this useful history. However, because it is a survey, it doesn't probe any single subject deeply; Army officers will be disappointed in the lack of tactical details in the coverage of Army operations. The book also suffers from over-advocacy of the Navy and its views (although this is hardly surprising considering the publisher, and Friedman's close ties to the Navy). Nevertheless, this is an excellent starting point in an effort to understand the Gulf War and its lessons.

CPT Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose by Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 240 pages, $22.50.

Global events of the past 2 years have established the United States as the world's dominant military power. The "imperial temptation" refers to the temptation of a superpower to use the military option to solve international crises rather than negotiation or other peaceful means. The spectre of the imperial temptation has already manifested itself in the war with Iraq.

According to the authors, President Bush perceived the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as the first post-Cold War threat to his concept of a new world order and U.S. national interests. Therefore, he was willing to initiate unilateral military action (if necessary) to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, regardless of U.S. domestic, congressional, or U.N. opposition.

The United States showed an unwillingness to fully explore alternatives to the use of power to resolve Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, so say the authors. They contend that under the terms of U.N. resolutions, we offered no other viable alternative to the Iraqi government, except the military one. Further, the authors say, the Bush administration's position was that "nothing less than an unambiguous humiliation for Saddam Hussein would constitute a policy success in the crisis."

After the war, the Bush administration failed to militarily support the Kurdish and S'hia rebellions after encouraging these groups to rise up against Saddam's regime. The authors imply the U.S. government allowed the rebellions to be squelched because, in the long run, an independent Kurdistan and a Moslem fundamentalist victory would be more of a threat to stability in the Gulf than the defanged Iraqi military-political machine.

New world order proponents advocate the use of our unchallenged military power again, if necessary, to eliminate other "troublesome" regional dictators. The main obstacle to a policy of "imperial temptation" would be a protracted conflict with heavy U.S. casualties as in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Such a conflict, undoubtedly, would not have prolonged U.S. domestic popular support.

Tucker and Hendrickson portray the end of the Cold War as a historic, but limited, time for the United States and its allies and their former enemy, the Soviet Union, to institute political and economic changes. In the opinion of the authors, these changes would not be nurtured by a U.S. administration that succumbs to the "imperial temptation" and opts to use its military machine as the principal catalyst for its new world order.

Michael S. Evancevich
Fort Huachuca, AZ



PFC LAKE

Messenger Gods of Battle: Radio, Radar, Sonar: The Story of Electronics in War by Tony Devereux (Riverside, NJ: Brassey's Inc., 1991), 322 pages, $46.45.

Devereux thoroughly examines a broad, complex topic often shrouded in secrecy. He discusses all aspects of the impact of electronics on military operations beginning with the discovery of electricity to the fundamental theory of electronics and its use in military communications, warning

devices, and weapon systems.

Devereux asserts that almost anything involving electronics in warfare is electronic warfare. He also points out that the principal centers for scientific research and development have been the United Kingdom and Germany. He examines Great Britain's use of radar and communications during the Battle of Britain and the use of radar and sonar by air forces and navies. In later chapters, the book focuses on developments made by the United States and the former Soviet Union after World War II.

Unfortunately, this book provides few new insights and focuses almost exclusively on the British perspective. There are a number of books that would be more useful to military professionals, such as Kahn's **Codebreakers: The Signal Corps Trilogy** as a part of the **U.S. Army history of World War II**; Colonel Don Gordon's book, **Electronic Warfare**; the many works of both U.S. and British writers on the German's World War II-era Enigma code machine; the Cambridge University Press series on **British Intelligence in the Second World War**; and Bamford's book, **The Puzzle Palace**.

Regrettably, the author takes a wonderful subject, rich in history and scientific discovery, and produces "just another book" on electronics and warfare.

LTC R.F. Riccardelli
Fort Campbell, KY

British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 4, **Security and Counterintelligence** by F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 408 pages, $34.50; and Vol. 5, **Strategic Deception** by Michael Howard (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 271 pages, $34.50.

These two volumes complete the official British history series on the influence of intelligence on strategy and operations during World War II. They describe CI and deception operations that supported British and allied tactical and strategic operations. While the technical details of controlling these operations are in Sir John Masterman's book, **The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945**, the operational details here are much more comprehensive since they're derived from declassified ULTRA material. As is true of the other three volumes, which began in 1979, the writing style, reminiscent of official British publications, is very dry. However, the wealth of information in these volumes makes them worth the read.

Volume 4 explains how German espionage was totally defeated; how MI-5 developed from meager beginnings at the start of World War II into a highly efficient organization; and how MI-5 countered and controlled enemy intelligence services' operations using signals intelligence (ULTRA), skillful double agents, and other sources. Volume 5 describes the planning and execution of the Normandy invasion; and deception operations involving double agents in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. It documents the enormous coordination the Twenty Committee performed to portray the appropriate deception. (The name, "double cross," comes from the Roman numerals XX for the Twenty Committee.)

Together, the two volumes portray the intelligence and security roles in deception operations. Critical to these operations was MI-5's ability to exercise absolute control in those two areas—a measure of control that may well be impossible in today's real-time news-oriented society.

The entire five-volume series is an essential addition to any intelligence library. What we need now is for the Center of Military History to follow Britain's lead and produce an authoritative history of the U.S. intelligence community's contribution to World War II operations.

LTC Harry K. Lesser Jr.
Monterey, CA

Military Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services by Chris C. Demchak (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 202 pages. $31.50.

Demchak, an active Army Reserve officer, uses the Army's introduction of the M1 Abrams tank as an example of what happens to organizations when the machines they rely on are too complex. He explores the reasons why military machines surprise their users, and how they can lead to poor performance. The message here is not that simple is better, but rather, under some conditions, complex can be worse. The goal is to understand the nature of complexity and its interactions between machines and organizations and their environments.

The book has two arguments: First, complexity in critical machines results in increased organizational complexity; second, a more complex military organization will have proportionately greater problems operating effectively in wartime. Complex organizational relationships distort knowledge identification and transfer mechanisms. Outcomes not only become more unpredictable, but also are more likely to be undesirable.

The Army of the future will face the same problems it faces today. It will be in a perpetual state of transition trying to keep up with enemy technological advancements. Unlike today, its structure in the future will respond more to machine requirements than to soldier requirements. Traditionally, the Army placed personnel over equipment, but now equipment needs drive planning decisions. The Army of the future will resemble the Air Force—an organization in which many technicians



operate and support few weapons.

Future armies will be smaller but no less complex, with increases in differentiation and interdependence compensating for fewer numbers. The focus will be to avoid state-of-the-art technology and complexity in the most critical systems. We must seek out the knowable unknowns by testing the integration of diverse subsystems. To design this integration, we must use the knowledge that the organization's members have.

This book has both practical and theoretical value. One of the interdependence lessons it spells out is the importance of combat support organizations in modern Army structure. Understanding the high cost of complex technical machines and knowing how to measure complexity allows managers to understand the character of the uncertainty inherent in these machines. Acquisition managers and systems analysts will enjoy this book. However, line officers should also use it to understand how organizational theory affects their equipment and military formation.

CPT Gilles Van Nederveen
San Antonio, TX



Naval Arms Control: A Strategic Assessment by Barry M. Blechman, William J. Durch, W. Philip Ellis, and Cathleen S. Fisher (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 268 pages, $45.00.

Produced at the Henry Stimson Center, this study examines the official rationale behind America's refusal to consider naval arms control. The U.S. position is that because we are virtually isolated geographically and maintain far-reaching economic and security relationships, we need maximum maritime operating freedom. The authors also investigate those American interests that naval arms control could affect.

Clearly, the United States is more dependent on the sea for its economic and military security than the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Most requests for naval arms control came from the Soviet side and were usually dismissed out of hand by the United States. This created an impasse in superpower arms control talks, and before the USSR's dissolution no progress had been made.

Although the recent formation of the CIS dates this book, common interests the United States and the CIS share in naval arms control are still valid: ensuring in peacetime the safety of naval forces, fishing fleet, and merchant fleet; avoiding accidents or incidents at sea; reducing naval armament costs; and reducing nuclear weapons cargo on the high seas.

The authors chronicle incidents of bumping, scraping, and sinking each other's naval vessels. They recommend specific self-restraints for both countries that would prohibit high-risk activities and thus achieve relative safety without lengthy negotiations. They also discuss the 1972 United States-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement.

Much of the book is devoted to the nuclear weapons at sea issue—an issue which has led to an impasse not only in naval arms control but also in strategic arms control talks. The authors discuss many means of verification, some of which will find application in future arms control agreements.

President Bush ordered the onshore basing of nuclear weapons from surface vessels and aircraft carriers, and Yeltsin has promised to do the same. Nuclear arms control may affect only the smaller nuclear powers, which currently show no intention of engaging in arms control. I recommend this book because the theories and chronology of incidents at sea are still vital to future naval arms control agreements.

CPT Gilles Van Nederveen
San Antonio, TX



Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine by Ariel Levite (a publication of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 192 pages, $22.00.

Levite has written an excellent book which ties together the often disparate concepts which form Israeli military doctrine. Throughout Israel's short history, conditions driving their national security policy have in some cases changed dramatically (relations with the superpowers, peace with Egypt), and in other cases not at all (continuing enmity with its other Arab neighbors). Through it all, Levite argues, Israel has adhered to the "cult of offense"—an effort to transfer the war to enemy territory and win quickly. This is mandated by Israel's lack of strategic depth, its multiple enemies, and its rocky relations with its prime benefactor—the United States.

Levite believes that Israel's mentality of "the best defense is a good offense" has caused the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to pressure leaders into

approving preemptive or preventive military action. Although this worked in 1967, it proved politically and militarily disastrous in 1982 in Lebanon. Levite points out that while the offense is an important principle of war, the British list at least eight other principles and the Americans, seven. This emphasis on the offense has also led to an erosion of defensive skills and forced the IDF into rash actions, such as the ill-fated 1973 "cavalry charges" against Egyptian Sagger missiles in the Sinai.

Levite advocates a more flexible defense based on NATO principles: mobile defense, combined with an area defense for vital regions, backed by large armored reserves and active air support. The defense will be strengthened by advanced technologies, including the greater range and accuracy of tank killing systems, precision guided munitions, and helicopters. The problem with instituting such a plan, as Levite sees it, lies in the IDF's institutional conservatism and the belief that Israeli borders are inviolable and that no enemy (read: Syria) can be allowed to penetrate them. Only when Israelis overcome these biases will they achieve a more balanced, offense-defense doctrinal approach.

CPT Aaron Danis
Fairfax, VA

SPC PREUNINGER

The Last Citadel, Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864-April 1865 by Noah Andre Trudeau (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company) 423 pages, $22.95.

This outstanding account of the fighting around Petersburg transports the reader into the tents of the men who fought there. This is the second volume of an end of the war trilogy. Trudeau's first book, **Bloody Roads South**, won the Civil War Round Table of New York's Fletcher Pratt Award.

Participants' diaries, letters, and memoirs add an emotional personal touch, thus giving names and personalities to some of the nameless combatants. This is a highly-charged story by a master craftsman, with emphasis on the nuts and bolts of tactics and strategy. Trudeau clearly explains the logistic difficulties of moving large numbers of men, to make a particular plan work or to stop the enemy's plan.

P.G.T. Beauregard's brilliant initial defense of Petersburg prevented the Union army from taking the city outright, and set up the need for a siege. With better intelligence, the Union army may have ended the war sooner. Petersburg was the key to capturing Richmond, the Confederate capital as well as the supply center. So the Union army slowly encircled Petersburg to cut off these supply routes. Trudeau uses the words of the commanders involved in describing daily tactics to complete a successful siege and in explaining the reasons for each movement. Trudeau's careful research is evident as he describes troop movements and why it took the specific times mentioned. He chronicles the breakdown in the coordination of timely movements. All of this allows the reader to see the problems through the commander's eyes and to "experience" the difficulties of command and control in the forested, swampy land of 1864 Petersburg.

The generous number of maps interspersed throughout the book illustrate the major moves of subordinate commanders on both sides. This solves the reader's problem of trying to visualize what movements were made as fighting progresses.

In many Civil War accounts, a commander is said to have been relieved of command; but this book tells why various commanders were relieved. During the battles around Petersburg, Governor Warren, General Hancock, and Brevet Major General Edward Ferrero—who was branded with the Union failure to effectively follow up the Crater explosion—all see the bottom of their careers drop out. The battle of the Crater was also General Burnside's last command. Governor Warren had earned a reputation for slowness in executing moves at Spotsylvania. His career was doomed after he hesitated to follow up an attack south of Petersburg. Especially interesting are the accounts of General Hancock's failures at Reams Station and his subsequent quarrel with his subordinates, the very people who could have helped him succeed.

General Grant's Final Reports articulate his "grand strategy" for Union forces throughout the Nation. These reports are interjected throughout the account, guiding the reader through the last months of the war.

This is a beautiful account of a deadly, desperate struggle. I highly recommend this entertaining, educational book for either the casual or the professional reader. The author's vivid narrative brings to mind the writings of Douglas Southall Freeman or Bruce Catton.

2LT William Keith Everett
Green Valley, AZ

101st
Military Intelligence Battalion



Regimental blue and silver (white) are MI colors. The background is an allusion to clouds and the atmosphere—a combat electronic warfare unit's main field of operations. The sunburst, a symbol of the Greek Sun God Helios, is a further reference to the atmosphere. The sunburst also denotes a compass rose and the multidirectional facets of the unit's radio functions. The sword refers to the unit's military ability, the lightning flash to speed and communications, and the key to intelligence and security.

The 101st MI Battalion was formed as a provisional battalion on February 1, 1977. It was reorganized from two TO&E companies—the 1st MI Company and the 337th ASA Company which were attached to the 937th Engineer Group at Fort Riley, Kansas. The battalion was then organized into four companies—Headquarters and Operations Company, A Company for collection and jamming, B Company for ground surveillance, and C Company for service support.

The battalion can trace its roots back to July 12, 1944, when the 1st CI Corps Detachment, now B Company, was constituted in France. On February 16, 1951, the company was assigned to the Regular Army. It was reorganized several times until May 3, 1971, when it emerged as the 1st MI Company. On July 21, 1978, the company was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division.

On July 1, 1952, the 337th Communication Reconnaissance Company, now A Company, was constituted at Fort Devens. It, too, went through numerous reorganizations, and on October 15, 1966, was designated the 337th ASA Company. B Company carries on its guidon six battle streamers plus the French and Belgian fourrageres, and has participated in 18 campaigns—7 in World War II and 11 in Vietnam. A Company displays 7 battle streamers on its guidon and has participated in 11 Vietnam campaigns.

On September 16, 1980, the 101st MI Battalion (CEWI) was constituted in the Regular Army and assigned to the 1st ID at Fort Riley. Its mission was to provide integrated all-source intelligence, EW OPSEC, and deception support to the division. On February 18, 1990, the battalion was once again reorganized to align with the Army of Excellence. The five companies are now tasked as follows: Headquarters Company, A Company for collection and jamming, B Company for intelligence and surveillance, C Company for EW, and D Company, the long-range surveillance detachment.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm earned the 101st MI Battalion three more battle streamers: "Defense of Saudi Arabia," "Liberation and Defense of Kuwait," and "Southwest Asia Cease-fire." The 101st has also been recommended for a Meritorious Unit Citation.

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

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
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